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PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL: THE LIFE HISTORY OF AN
IDEAL LEGAL TRANSPLANT
Joel M. Ngugi *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article hopes to accomplish three things. First, it will re-
visit the historical origins of the doctrine of promissory estoppel
in the American law of contracts and the role that Samuel Willis-
ton,1 the Chief Reporter of the Restatement (First) of Contracts2
("First Restatement") played in the evolution of the doctrine. The
dominant theory is that Williston conceptualized the new promis-
sory estoppel doctrine in a way that retarded and blunted the
doctrine shortly after its birth.3 This theory is adhered to by both
critics and proponents of the expansion of promissory estoppel as
a ground of promissory obligation.4 According to both the critics
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. S.J.D., LL.M,
Harvard Law School; LL.B, University of Nairobi, Kenya. I would like to thank Adam
Reuben Franklin and Marie V. Ericson for their excellent research assistance.
1. Samuel Williston was a professor at Harvard Law School. He was one of the
founding members of the American Law Institute (ALI) as a "movement... which should
have the broad object of improving the law." SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 310 (1940). It was Williston, together with Professor Joseph Beale of
Harvard Law School, and Mr. William Draper Lewis (who later become the Director of
ALI) who proposed that ALI undertake the "project of a Restatement of the common law in
as brief, exact, and simple form as was possible." Id.
2. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (1932).
3. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 60-65 (1974); Kevin M.
Teeven, A Legal History of Binding Gratuitous Promises at Common Law: Justifiable Re-
liance and Moral Obligation, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 11, 25 (2004). However, Professor Mark
Movsesian has recently argued that Williston, in fact, championed section 90's version of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See Mark Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 220 (2005). Professor Movsesian disputes Gilmore's account and
argues that by the time of drafting the First Restatement, Williston had become an "en-
thusiastic[]" supporter of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See id. at 247-48.
4. For example, Professor Teeven, a partisan of the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
notes that Williston failed to point to the commercial applications of justifiable reliance as
a ground of promissory obligation and contributed to a "formalist retreat from previous
expansion of promissory liability grounded upon natural law principles." Kevin M. Teeven,
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and proponents, the Willistonian original formulation of section
90 in the First Restatement was meant to make sure that the new
doctrine was limited in reach and growth potential.' While the
critics of promissory estoppel praise Willistonian genius in the
limiting formulation, the proponents of promissory estoppel assail
him for what they see as undue formalism in his comprehension
of promissory obligations.6 In this article, I argue that notwith-
standing Williston's motivations, hopes, or original intent in
structuring the principle of justifiable reliance in section 90 of the
First Restatement, his solution facilitated the growth and evolu-
tion of promissory estoppel, not its limitation and restriction. I
will demonstrate that by hoisting the new doctrine aimed at en-
forcing unbargained-for promises on to a concept of estoppel, Wil-
liston unwittingly liberalized estoppel and unshackled it from its
previous restrictive doctrinal moorings.7 The result was bound to
be the expansion-not constriction-of the possible range of fac-
tual scenarios covered by the new doctrine.
Second, this article recasts the story of the origins of the
American concept of promissory estoppel as a legal transplant.8
While the origins of promissory estoppel have been told in nu-
merous law review articles and books, there have been few at-
tempts to tell its history as a legal transplant from English law
and how it both was shaped and in turn helped shape English
law.9 In this regard, this article describes how, by mid-nineteenth
Origins of Promissory Estoppel: Justifiable Reliance and Commercial Uncertainty Before
Williston's Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 499, 533 (2004). On the other hand, Grant
Gilmore, a noted critic of the doctrine explains that Williston refused to encapsulate the
doctrine of promissory estoppel in section 75 of the First Restatement because Williston,
like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., conceived consideration as "a tool for narrowing the range
of contractual liability." GILMORE, supra note 3, at 21.
5. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 3, at 66 (critic); Teeven, supra note 4, at 532-33
(proponent).
6. See, e.g., Teeven, supra note 4, at 603-04.
7. Before the First Restatement, with the exception of proprietary estoppel, the gen-
eral doctrine of estoppel could not support a cause of action. Estoppel could be used defen-
sively as a "shield" but not as a "sword." See infra Parts V-VII.
8. For the meaning of a legal transplant, see infra notes 241-42 and accompanying
text.
9. Professor Eric Mills Holmes has traced the evolution of the American concept of
promissory estoppel through four stages-estoppel, contract, tort, and equity-but did not
specifically focus on the doctrinal basis of promissory estoppel from the other classifica-
tions of estoppel as they existed in English law at the time the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel was invented. See generally Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Es-
toppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45 (1996) [hereinafter Holmes, Four Phases]; Eric Mills
Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263 (1996). Simi-
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century, American courts and jurists were grappling with the
problem of relied on, unbargained-for promises and shows how a
selective importation of ideas from the English concept of estoppel
enabled them to fashion a remedy that crystallized in the new
doctrine of promissory estoppel.1 ° I analyze the development of
the new doctrine of promissory estoppel as "borrowed" from the
general English concept of estoppel to determine if it was a suc-
cessful legal transplant or not.11
Third, this article traces the influence of the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel, as it emerged in the United States, exerted in
England and the rest of the world. In the case of England, of
course, this would be a classic case of "reverse influence" or re-
verse importation.12 I tentatively suggest that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel is an "ideal" legal transplant. This is because
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is essentially a flexible, equi-
table doctrine which lays out a general structure capable of being
filled with local content. The malleability of the doctrine is an
open invitation to comparativists and legal reformers to borrow it.
While the success of the diffusion of legal thought is often credi-
bly explained in instrumental terms (for example, the cultural
prestige of the producing legal system or gun-boat diplomacy or
outright imposition of foreign law through colonization), the in-
fluence of promissory estoppel in England and the rest of the
world would suggest that legal ideas that are pragmatic can also
spread because of their sheer utility.
larly, Professor Kevin M. Teeven has produced a meticulous history of the origins of prom-
issory estoppel, see Teeven, supra note 4, but his account is aimed at demonstrating that
contrary to the claims of Samuel Williston, the Reporter to the First Restatement, courts
regularly granted commercial promisees relief from reliance hardship in the absence of
consideration long before the First Restatement came into being. See, e.g., id. at 506-07.
10. Infra Parts II-IV.
11. Id.
12. I have borrowed the term "reverse influence" from Assaf Likhovski. See Assaf Lik-
hovski, Czernowitz, Lincoln, Jerusalem, and the Comparative History of American Juris-
prudence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 621, 635 n.55 (2003). In a footnote, Assaf gives
two non-law examples of reverse influence: the emergence of the academic study of Eng-
lish literature in nineteenth-century India and its re-exportation back to England towards
the end of that century and the emergence of modem economics and other social sciences.
See id.
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II. THE PROBLEM THAT NECESSITATED THE BIRTH
OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Like all legal inventions or transplants, the American doctrine
of promissory estoppel was developed to address a perceived prob-
lem in the extant legal doctrines."3 The problem which the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel was meant to address has been de-
scribed in dozens of articles and commentaries.14 Only a brief
rehash is necessary here. By the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, due to the influences of Classical Legal Thought (CLT) on
the evolution of the doctrines of contract law, the doctrine of con-
sideration had been defined in singularly narrow terms to exclude
all non-bargain promissory transactions. 5 This emergence of the
bargain theory of contracts meant that all promises in which the
promisor did not specifically bargain for a return promise or per-
formance went un-enforced even if the promisee had suffered
substantial detriment as a result of her reliance on the promise. 16
A promise would not be enforced even if the promisee had relied
on it to incur substantial detriment as long as the promisee's acts
of reliance were not bargained for or requested by the promisor in
13. Professor Alan Watson argues that transplants are the main source of legal
change. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH To COMPARATIVE LAW 95
(1974). Lawyers prefer to imitate laws and principles from other jurisdictions rather than
react directly to solve societal problems with an "original" rule or principle. See id. at 99.
14. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 678, 679-684 (1984); Holmes, Four Phases, supra note 9, at 45-56; Teeven, supra
note 4, at 512-43.
15. The term "Classical Legal Thought" was coined by Professor Duncan Kennedy to
refer to the "form of American legal thought that emerged between 1850 and 1885 and
flourished between 1885 and 1940." Duncan Kennedy, The Rise & Fall of Classical Legal
Thought 7 (1975) (unpublished manuscript copy on file with author). Professor Kennedy
termed it Classical Legal Thought because this mode of legal thought amounted to a "ra-
tionalistic ordering of the whole legal universe." Id. According to Professor Kennedy, Clas-
sical Legal Thought was:
[A]n ordering, in the sense that it took a very large number of actual proc-
esses and events and asserted that they could be reduced to a much smaller
number with a definite pattern. What was ordered was the enormous mass of
rules and standards courts applied to different kinds of cases. The particular
simplification that developed was influenced by the actual content of the
rules it organized and, in turn, constantly influenced them . . . The basic
mode of this influence of theory on results is that the ordering of myriad
practices into a systematization occurs through simplifying and generalizing
categories, abstractions that become tools available when the practitioner
(judge or advocate) approaches a new problem.
Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
16. See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1196 (1998).
[Vol. 41:425
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making her promise. Such reliance was termed "unbargained-for
reliance" and did not meet the requirements of consideration. 17
Hence, the definition of consideration sometimes worked harsh
results.
The possibility of working unfairness on promisees became
greater in American contract law when the definition of consid-
eration explicitly embraced the bargain element toward the end
of the nineteenth century.' Before this evolution to the bargain
theory, consideration was mainly defined only in terms of benefit
to the promisor or detriment to the promisee. 9 A good American
example is the definition of consideration given in the venerable
case of Hamer v. Sidway,2 ° a leading case in almost all first-year
contracts case books. 2' In this case, Judge Parker endorsed the
definition of consideration given by treatise writer Anson:
Courts "will not ask whether the thing which forms the consideration
does in fact benefit the promisee or a third party, or is of any sub-
stantial value to any one. It is enough that something is promised,
done, forborne, or suffered by the party to whom the promise is made
as consideration for the promise made to him.
2 2
This definition of consideration closely tracked the definition
then obtaining in England. For example, Judge Parker in Hamer
also approvingly cites the definition of consideration supplied by
the English Exchequer Chamber in Currie v. Misa21 in 1875: "A
'valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist ei-
ther in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one
party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility
given, suffered, or undertaken by the other.'
24
17. Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory Estoppel in New York, 15 BROOK. L. REV. 27, 28-29
(1949); see also LON L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 363-64 (1947).
18. See Knapp, supra note 16, at 1194-95; Teeven, supra note 4, at 513-20.
19. Knapp, supra note 16, at 1194.
20. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
21. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINES, 608-13 (3rd ed.
2003); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT, 204-06 (8th ed. 2003);
CHARLES KNAPP ET AL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 41-45 (5th
ed. 2003).
22. Hamer, 27 N.E. at 257 (quoting WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE ENGLISH
LAW OF CONTRACT AND OF AGENCY IN ITS RELATION TO CONTRACT 63 (Jerome C. Knowlton
ed., 2d American ed. Chicago, Callaghan and Co. 1887)).
23. 10 L.R. Exch. 153 (1875).
24. Hamer, 27 N.E. at 257 (quoting Currie, 10 L.R. Exch. at 162).
2007]
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Both these English and American definitions of consideration
required that a plaintiff prove only one element in order to suc-
ceed on a contract theory: a benefit to the defendant or a detri-
ment to the plaintiff. To this pre-classical element of considera-
tion-namely benefit to the promisor or detriment to the
promisee-CLT sought to add a second element. This was the
element of bargain. 25 According to CLT, it was not merely suffi-
cient that the promisor had benefited or that the promisee had
suffered some detriment: CLT insisted that the benefit or the det-
riment must have been conferred, or suffered as the case may be,
as an inducement for the promise-i.e., the action conferring
benefit or inflicting detriment must have been bargained for in
exchange for the promise. 26 This changing definition of considera-
tion heralded the rise of the bargain theory of consideration.27
As Professor Charles L. Knapp has noted, this changing defini-
tion of consideration was "more notable for what it excluded
rather than for what it included."2"
By insisting that the "detriment" [or benefit must have been] ...
given in exchange for the promise, . .. [this definition of considera-
tion] effectively ignored the possibility of the promisee's substantial
change of position in reliance on the promise, not bargained for as
the price of the promise, but substantial and detrimental neverthe-
less. 9
Among the greatest supporters for the bargain-based definition
of consideration in the United States was Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes.3" Indeed, Justice Holmes was explicitly attacking the
25. See Knapp, supra note 16, at 1194-95.
26. In 1896, Professor Reuben Benjamin defined consideration in the following words:
When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee, or any other person on his
behalf, confers or promises to confer any benefit upon the promisor, or incurs
or promises to incur any detriment, and such benefit, detriment, or promise is
the inducement of the promisor's promise, it is a sufficient consideration for
the promise.
REUBEN M. BENJAMIN, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE AMERICAN LAW OF CONTRACT 21
(Indianapolis and Kansas City, Bowen-Merrill Co. 1889) (citations omitted).
27. See Knapp, supra note 16, at 1194-96; Teeven, supra note 4, at 511-20.
28. Knapp, supra note 16, at 1194.
29. Id.
30. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., has been famously described as "the great oracle of
American legal thought." Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 787, 787 (1989). Holmes's writings at the time were interpreted as an attack on
Langdellian formalism, and he was therefore considered as the first legal realist. See, e.g.,
Steven J. Burton, Introduction to THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY
[Vol. 41:425
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detriment-benefit definition of consideration when he put forth
his famous definition of consideration in terms of bargain.3'
Holmes was interested in narrowing-not expanding-the range
of contractual liability.32 Hence his bargain theory:
It is said that any benefit conferred by the promisee on the promi-
sor, or any detriment incurred by the promisee, may be a considera-
tion. It is also thought that every consideration may be reduced to a
case of the latter sort, using the word "detriment" in a somewhat
broad sense.
It appears to me that it has not always been sufficiently borne in
mind that the same thing may be a consideration or not, as it is dealt
with by the parties....
•.. [Ilt is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the
agreement, it is given and accepted as the motive or inducement of
the promise. Conversely, the promise must be made and accepted as
the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing the considera-
tion. The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal con-
ventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and
promise. 
33
The definition given by Justice Loevinger of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota in Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp.34 illustrates the
bargain theory of consideration:
The test that has been developed by the common law for determining
the enforceability of promises is the doctrine of consideration. This is
a crude and not altogether successful attempt to generalize the con-
ditions under which promises will be legally enforced. Consideration
requires that a contractual promise be the product of a bargain.
However, in this usage, "bargain" does not mean an exchange of
things of equivalent, or any, value. It means a negotiation resulting
in the voluntary assumption of an obligation by one party upon the
condition of an act or forbearance by the other.
3U
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 2 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000).
31. See Peter Linzer, Consider Consideration, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1317, 1320 n.17
(2000).
32. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 21.
33. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw, 289-94 (48th prtg. Boston, Little,
Brown and Co. 1923) (1881).
34. 104 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1960).
35. Id. at 665 (citations omitted).
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By the time the First Restatement was being drafted, this bar-
gain theory of consideration had achieved predominant status.36
Williston wanted to propagate this "modern" definition of consid-
eration, but faced the problem of how to deal with the cases that
had enforced unbargained-for promises. 37 Professor Grant Gil-
more's re-created account of how section 90 of the First Restate-
ment came into being describes the hesitation with which Willis-
ton and the other Restaters 3s (with the exception of Arthur
Corbin) had to include the section in the First Restatement:
In the debate [on the definition of consideration] Corbin and the
Cardozoeans lost out to Williston and the Holmesians. In Williston's
view, that should have been the end of the matter.
Instead, Corbin returned to the attack. At the next meeting of the
Restatement group, he addressed them more or less in the following
manner: Gentlemen, you are engaged in restating the common law of
contracts. You have recently adopted a definition of consideration. I
now submit to you a list of cases-hundreds, perhaps or thou-
sands?-in which courts have imposed contractual liability under
circumstances in which, according to your definition, there would be
no consideration and therefore no liability. Gentlemen, what do you
intend to do about these cases?
The Restaters, honorable men, evidently found Corbin's argument
unanswerable. However, instead of reopening the debate on the con-
sideration definition, they elected to stand by § 75 but to add a new
section-§ 90-incorporating the estoppel idea although without us-
ing the word "estoppel."3 9
Several writers have plausibly impugned the historical accu-
racy of Gilmore's account.40 One also may question Gilmore's de-
36. See Kevin M. Teeven, The Advent of Recovery on Market Transactions in the Ab-
sence of a Bargain, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 289, 306-11 (2002).
37. See GILMORE, supra note 3, at 63-64.
38. Id. The other Restaters were: Professor Arthur Corbin of Yale Law School; Profes-
sor William H. Page of the University of Wisconsin; Professor Merton L. Ferson of the
University of Cincinnati; Professor Dudley 0. McGovney of the University of California;
Professor George P. Thompson of Cornell Law School; and Professor William E. McCurdy
of Harvard Law School. See WILLISTON, supra note 1, at 312.
39. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 63-64.
40. See, e.g., Movsesian, supra note 3, at 247-48 ("The conventional story, popularized
by Gilmore, holds that Williston reluctantly agrees to include a promissory estoppel provi-
sion in the Restatement only after his adviser Arthur Corbin embarrasses him by pointing
out a number of cases relying on the doctrine. In fact, though, nobody has to shame Willis-
ton into accepting promissory estoppel. On the contrary, Williston repeatedly claims credit
for having invented the doctrine and for making it a success. Indeed, according to Corbin,
Williston helps "bludgeono" advisers into going along with promissory estoppel, and the
[Vol. 41:425
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piction of all the "honorable" Restaters (with the exception of Ar-
thur Corbin) as conservative Langdellians. Indeed, some of them,
like Professor William H. Page, had openly experimented with
ideas which would be considered "realist" or "relational contract
theory" today.41 Notwithstanding the historical inaccuracy of Gil-
more's account, however, it is fair to conclude that Williston's pre-
ferred definition of consideration (in terms of the bargain theory)
left no room for a theory of justifiable reliance within the doctrine
of consideration.42 Professor Kevin M. Teeven has argued the
point further, that in fact Williston's preference for the bargain
theory of consideration led him to diminish the role of justifiable
reliance in the law of contracts:
Williston's claim [that actionable justifiable reliance had been gen-
erally applicable to cases of charitable subscriptions] reinforced his
position that the doctrine of consideration was grounded upon recip-
rocity of bargain, and his marginalization of past justifiable relief
cases thereby insinuated that his proposed promissory estoppel sec-
tion was only needed only for charitable and family promises that
necessarily fell outside the bargain construct. Williston's attempt to
limit the scope of promissory estoppel would retard reliance relief for
the subsequent generation.
III. THE WILLISTONIAN SOLUTION
Williston wanted to generalize a rule which would apply to the
disparate situations whereby unbargained-for promises were en-
records of the ALI discussions on the Restatement suggest that, more than anyone else,
Williston champions the doctrine against its conservative detractors.") (alteration in origi-
nal) (citations omitted).
41. Stewart Macaulay reports that, in 1914, Professor Page presented a paper on Ehr-
lich's "living law" providing that Ehrlich described his living law as:
[Iln contrast to that which is in force merely in the courts and with the offi-
cials. The living law is that law which is not imprisoned in rules of law, but
which dominates life itself. The sources of its knowledge are above all the
modem documents, and also immediate study of life itself, of commerce, of
customs and usage, and of all sorts of organizations, including those which
are recognized by the law, and, indeed, those which are disapproved by the
law.
Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: "Things Ain't What They Used
to Be," 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 367-68 (quoting William H. Page, Professor Ehrlich's Czer-
nowitz Seminar of Living Law, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 825 (Jerome Hall ed.,
1938).
42. See infra Part III.
43. Teeven, supra note 3, at 25 (internal citation omitted).
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forced.44 Consequently, several authors have labeled Williston a
Langedillian.45 Williston himself denied such a charge and dis-
tinguished himself from Langdell's view of the law-as early as
1929.46 Still, it is fair to say that Williston was wedded to CLT,
and it is this adherence that compelled him to generalize a rule
which would apply to the disparate situations whereby unbar-
gained-for promises were enforced by the courts.47 Similarly, as
44. See Proceedings at the Fourth Annual Meeting, 4 A.L.I. Proc. 86 (1926) (statement
of Samuel Williston) [hereinafter, A.L.I. Proceedings].
45. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 3, at 14 ("The [general] theory [of contract] itself
was pieced together by [Langdell's] successors-notably Holmes, in broad philosophical
outline, and Williston, in meticulous, although not always accurate, scholarly detail.");
James W. Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2003) ("Thus the 'contract' is defined through the offer and acceptance
rubric, where all the parties' obligations are objectified in the stated agreement. This
model has its roots in classical contract law, most commonly associated with the grand
treatises and scholarship of Samuel Williston, which sought to objectify and formalize con-
tract law through a series of universally applicable legal rules.") (footnotes omitted); Roy
Kreitner, Fear of Contract, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 429, 461 (2004) ("The general theory of con-
tract, worked out over the course of the nineteenth century and established as fundamen-
tal in contract thinking by classical thinkers toward the close of that century, raised the
level of contract thinking to the heights of abstraction. The search for abstract principles
to govern all of contract seems to be a mark of classical legal thought, as evidenced by Wil-
liston's introduction to his first edition .. ") (citation omitted).
46. SAMUEL WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 114 (1929) ("Lang-
dell is an example of a conservative revolutionary .... Partly owing to an inability to use
his eyes to any considerable extent, an infirmity which overtook him before he had been
teaching in Cambridge [at Harvard Law School] many years, he had little interest or sym-
pathy with any development of law later than 1850. He was a legal theologian deriving the
principles of his theology almost entirely from English cases prior to that date, and rea-
soning from those principles with relentless logic. The limits which he thus fixed for him-
self prevents his written work from having any wide appeal to-day."). In his autobiogra-
phy, Williston repeats this almost word for word, but adds "nor did his legal thinking
sufficiently take account of changes in law as a constant and necessary process, however
gradual and slow." WILLISTON, supra note 1, at 200. Williston found Langdell's position
that law was a science similar to the physical sciences untenable:
In one respect, and a very important one, law in this sense differs from physi-
cal law. In physical law what has happened in the past will, under similar
circumstances, happen in the future. Accurate observations of the past and
present enable the scientist within the range of that observation to make ab-
solute prophecies as to the future. This is not so with regard to law made by
courts and legislatures. Uniform decisions of 300 years on a particular ques-
tion may be, and sometimes have been overthrown in a day, and the single
decision at the end of the series may establish a rule of law at variance with
all that has gone before .... It is never quite certain that the last decision
justifies a prophecy of uniformity in the future.
Id. at 201.
47. See, e.g., WILLISTON, supra note 46, at 95. Citing the lack of uniformity and the
complexity of the legal rules as major defects in American law, Williston stated:
When the law is doubtful men are encouraged to delay the performance of
their obligations, if some theory can be found to support the contention that
they are under no duty .... Complexity of the law is opposed to simplicity.
[Vol. 41:425
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Professor Duncan Kennedy has shown, CLT was wedded to the
idea of ordering "the enormous mass of rules and standards
courts applied to different kinds of cases" to a definite rule with a
definite pattern.48 As Thomas Grey has shown, "the heart of clas-
sical theory was its aspiration that the legal system be made
complete through universal formality, and universally formal
through conceptual order."49 This explains why, from the begin-
ning, Williston aimed to find a "general provision" which would
cover all instances where courts had granted relief on the basis of
unbargained-for promises. 50 Hence, in defense of section 88 (later
renumbered as section 90) and after identifying a number of
situations where "reliance on a promise, though there has been no
price or consideration paid for it, renders the promisor liable,"51
Williston stated: "If the law is to be simplified and clarified, it can
be done only by coordinating the decisions under general rules
not by stating empirically a succession of specific cases without
any binding thread of principle."52
Broad general rules are simple. Where distinctions and exceptions are nu-
merous, even if the distinctions are well settled, the law is complex. If the
distinctions and exceptions are founded on unsubstantial grounds, the com-
plexity is unnecessary, and the lack of reasonableness makes such distinc-
tions more difficult to remember.
Id. at 95-96.
48. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 13.
49. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT L. REV. 1, 11 (1983).
50. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was included as section 83(e) in the First Pre-
liminary Draft of the First Restatement. As Williston explains in the comment to section 83
of the Preliminary Draft, the section:
[Girouped together a number of cases where promises have been held en-
forceable, and justly so, though no present exchange was given or received for
them. Subdivisions (a) [on promises to pay debts barred by the statute of
limitations], (b) [on promises to honor voidable contracts], (c) [on promises to
correct a "plain error" in a performance which the promisor has already re-
ceived] and (d) [on promises by guarantors to pay regardless of failure by the
creditor to supply requisite notice] of subsection (1) cover familiar cases of the
sort.
Subdivision (e) [the promissory estoppel section] of the same subsection al-
lows some elasticity in the law to prevent serious injustice if a promisor in-
duces action on the faith of his promise and then refuses to perform it. It
seems better to make a general provision of the kind than to attempt by a fic-
tion to find consideration for a gratuitous promise when there is none.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 83 cmt. at 65 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1925) (cita-
tion omitted).
51. AMER. LAW INST., Commentaries on Contract: Restatement No. 2, at 14 (1926)
[hereinafter A.L.I Commentaries].
52. Id. at 19.
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Williston would later repeat this defense almost word for word
during the proceedings for the adoption of the First Restate-
ment.5 3 Hence, in the attempt to formulate the "general provi-
sion," Williston attempted to demonstrate a pattern of cases
whereby unbargained-for promises had been enforced by the
courts. He systematized the cases as follows: He started with the
proposition that most of the cases where relief for unbargained-
for promises had been granted involved promises which were gra-
tuitous, that is, made in non-bargain settings.54 To be sure, Wil-
liston acknowledged that there were few exceptions, but he
thought the greater weight of authority was against these excep-
tions.55 Williston then reasoned that most of these "exceptional"
cases were decided on a theory of "estoppel." 6 Williston found
this jurisprudential basis troubling because he thought these
situations did not give rise to a "true" estoppel.57 He also found
"estoppel" troubling as a concept because it was too elastic."s
Williston therefore suggested section 90 of the First Restate-
ment-fastidiously avoiding calling it an "estoppel."59 However, as
he had admitted, "there [was] a binding thread in all the classes
of cases . . . namely, the justifiable reliance of the promisee."60
53. A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 44, at 86 ("Now, if the law is to be simplified or
clarified, one must try to reduce to broader or more general principles, so far as possible,
large groups of cases where the courts reach a decision in favor of enforcing promises be-
cause of such reasons as are stated in section 88, although the courts may not formulate
the reasons in just those words.").
54. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 139, at 308 (1931).
55. See id. at 313.
56. See id. at 307-14. Williston entitled this section of his treatise, "Estoppel as a
Substitute for Consideration." Id. at 307.
57. Id. at 313 ("A class of cases where a genuine estoppel exists must be distinguished
from those discussed in this section."); see also A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 44, at 89-90
("I should like to confine the meaning of the word "estoppel" to a misrepresentation of
some fact that was relied upon. There is no misrepresentation of fact here; there is simply
a gratuitous promise which the promisor knows is gratuitous and which the promisee
knows is gratuitous.").
58. See A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 44, at 89. When asked whether the precursor to
section 90 of the First Restatement was meant to cover "equitable estoppel," Williston said
that "equitable estoppel" "was a very bad name for it." Id. Williston explained: "I don't
know [what I would call the new doctrine]; and nearly anything can be called estoppel.
When a lawyer or a judge does not know what other name to give for his decision to decide
a case in a certain way, he says there is an estoppel ... ." Id.
59. For the controversy of whether Williston had initially decided to completely ex-
clude unbargained-for but relied on promises from inclusion in the First Restatement, but
acquiesced when he was confronted by Arthur Corbin with a pile of cases demonstrating
the point. See supra footnotes 37-38 and accompanying text.
60. A.L.I. Commentaries, supra note 51, at 19-20.
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While he formally avoided using the terminology "estoppel" be-
cause he perceived it to be too elastic, Williston unwittingly was
founding his new doctrine firmly on the jurisprudence of estoppel
by using the language of justifiable reliance. A rose by any other
name, it would turn out, smells as sweet.61
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH THE WILLISTONIAN SOLUTION
As stated above, Williston was acutely aware of the dangers of
comprehending the new doctrine under the principles of estop-
pel.62 However, by finding that the golden thread that linked the
disparate non-bargain cases was the justifiable reliance of the
promise, Williston also, ironically, brought those cases within the
jurisprudence of the dominant type of estoppel: estoppel in pais."
Bigelow, the most prominent American treatise-writer on estop-
pel at the time Williston was drafting the First Restatement,
states that estoppel in pais "consists in holding for truth a repre-
sentation acted upon when the person who made it or his privies
seek to deny its truth and to deprive the party who has acted
upon it of the benefit obtained."64
As the above definition makes clear, the basis of estoppel in
pais was that the person who received a representation reasona-
bly and justifiably "acted on the representation" to her detri-
ment.65 Cabab6 identifies this essential requirement of the estop-
pel in the language that the person who receives the representa-
tion "must be prejudicially affected by the action he has taken."66
He clarifies this further by stating that the party receiving the
representation must have altered her position "for the worse."67
61. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
62. See supra Part III.
63. See infra Part VI for a discussion of the various kinds of estoppels. Estoppel in
pais is defined as "acts, admissions, or conduct which have induced a change of position in
accordance with the real or apparent intention of the party against whom they are al-
leged." MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL AND ITS APPLICATION
IN PRACTICE 3 (Little, Brown & Co., 4th ed. 1886).
64. Id. at 543 (citation omitted). Williston cites this same edition in his treatise. See
WILLISTON, supra note 54, § 139, at 308 n.24.
65. See BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 620-22; MICHAEL CABABt, THE PRINCIPLES OF
ESTOPPEL: AN ESSAY 78-82 (London, W. Maxwell & Son 1888).
66. CABABt, supra note 65, at 78.
67. Id. at 79.
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The point here is that Williston clearly borrowed the notion of
"justifiable reliance" from the jurisprudence of estoppel in pais.
Williston, however, had sought to cure the elasticity of the ge-
neric term "estoppel" by avoiding calling it an estoppel and in-
stead settling on the rather inelegant, "Promise Reasonably In-
ducing Definite and Substantial Action."6 It turned out, however,
that not even an explicit refusal to call the new doctrine an es-
toppel would save it from the vagaries of the elastic and nebulous
"estoppel" that Williston so resented. Two reasons accounted for
Williston's inability to "save" the newly minted promissory estop-
pel from the nebulous fate of the generic estoppel.
First, Williston had already brought the new doctrine within
the jurisprudence of the generic estoppel through the hook of
"justifiable reliance."69 Indeed, Williston himself had coined the
term "promissory estoppel."7 ° The consequence was that the new
doctrine was treated as an estoppel in pais, which had been liber-
alized from its most restrictive element-that the misrepresenta-
tion made by the defendant had to be one of existing facts.71 So,
"promissory estoppel" was first and foremost an "estoppel"--only
it was an unbound estoppel.
Second, Williston failed to note a basic tension that character-
izes the jurisprudence of estoppel generally. This tension is the
question of "whether estoppel is one area of law or several."72 As I
will show shortly, this question has more than pedantic signifi-
cance.73 If Williston had adverted his mind to the fact that estop-
pel consisted of several areas of law, he would have come upon
another truism about the specific branch of estoppel from which
he was borrowing: that it could not found a cause of action-it
was merely a rule of evidence.74 Had Williston taken account of
this truism, he would have understood that he was not only
68. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
69. See supra notes 57 & 60 and accompanying text.
70. See Samuel Williston, Formation of Contracts, in PROBLEMS IN THE MODERN LAW
OF CONTRACTS 3, 15 (1933); WILLISTON, supra note 54, § 139 at 253; A.L.I. Commentaries,
supra note 51, at 16.
71. See Jorden v. Money, 5 H.L.C. 185, 214-15, 10 Eng. Rep. 868, 882 (H.L. 1854). For
a discussion of the effect of Jorden v. Money on the law of estoppel, see infra pp. 188-90.
72. ELIZABETH COOKE, THE MODERN LAW OF ESTOPPEL 3 (2000).
73. See infra Parts VI, IX.
74. See Low v. Bouverie [1891] 3 Ch. 82, 101 (C.A.) (Lindley, L.J.) ("Estoppel is not a
cause of action-it is a rule of evidence which precludes a person from denying the truth of
some statement previously made by himself.").
[Vol. 41:425
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
bringing his new doctrine within the jurisprudence of estoppel by
hooking it to the language of "justifiable detrimental reliance,"
but he was also enlarging the scope of that jurisprudence by not
explicitly limiting its legal consequences to evidentiary issues.75
As noted above, in appraising the development of non-bargain-
based theories of promise enforcement, Williston was quick to
note that American courts had started using some form of estop-
pel. 76 He was also quick to notice that the form of estoppel util-
ized in these cases differed from the "true" estoppel-estoppel by
representation. 7
If Williston had adverted his mind to the fact that estoppel
straddled more than one area of law, however, he probably would
have had better luck in limiting the explosion of non-bargain-
based theories of promise enforcement. He would then have noted
that the American courts, which were utilizing estoppel to enforce
unbargained-for promises, were not only modifying one of the es-
sential elements of estoppel by representation, but were also
enlarging its province by giving it "teeth," which "true" estoppel
did not have in the traditional law of estoppel. Unlike the English
courts, the American courts were permitting litigants to use es-
toppel as a cause of action. 7' That realization could only have
come with an understanding that there is more than one form of
estoppel, and that only some classes of estoppel could constitute a
cause of action. 79 Under the law of estoppel, the only form of es-
toppel that could constitute a cause of action was proprietary es-
toppel."0 As we will see shortly, the effect of the other reliance-
based estoppels was only to prevent the representor from denying
or going back on what she had said." As such, these other reli-
ance-based estoppels could not constitute a cause of action "al-
though [they] may support a cause of action by blocking a de-
fence." 2
75. See infra Parts VII.B, IX.
76. See WILLISTON, supra note 54, § 139, at 307-14.
77. See id. at 307, 313; A.L.L Proceedings, supra note 44, at 89-90.
78. See infra Part V.
79. See id.
80. See COOKE, supra note 72, at 118.
81. See id.; see also infra Parts VI, IX.
82. COOKE, supra note 72, at 118; see also infra Parts VI, IX.
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This use of reliance-based estoppels would have meant, for ex-
ample, that there was no need to fashion a thorough-going con-
tractual remedy to save litigants like the plaintiff in Greiner v.
Greiner.3 In Greiner, a mother promised to convey a tract of land
to her son if the son moved from one county, where he was then
residing, to another, where the rest of the family lived.' Follow-
ing the promise, the son gave up his homestead in the one county
and moved to the other county, relying on his mother's promise to
convey the land to him."5 The son set up his new homestead in
the eighty-acre tract of land identified by the mother, made valu-
able improvements thereon, and lived there for nearly one year.86
When his mother sought to evict him from the land and recover
possession of the eighty-acre tract of land, the Supreme Court of
Kansas held that the son was entitled to continued possession
and deed. 7 The Supreme Court of Kansas decided the case on a
theory of promissory estoppel, and explicitly relied on section 90
of the draft of the First Restatement for support.8 8 Rather than re-
lying on this "new" doctrine of promissory estoppel, however, the
court could have used the English doctrine of proprietary estoppel
to reach a similar result.89
In the end, therefore, Williston's formulation of section 90 of
the First Restatement ended up unwittingly contributing toward
the fusing of estoppel into one area of law in the United States.9"
This fusion was brought about because under the new promissory
estoppel doctrine, all representations which were justifiably re-
lied upon could be used as the basis of a cause of action. 91 It was
no longer necessary to establish whether the estoppel under
which the plaintiff brought her case was a proprietary estoppel or
not.92 Since under the traditional law of estoppel only proprietary
83. 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930).
84. See id. at 760, 762.
85. Id. at 762.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 759, 762.
88. See id. at 762.
89. For a description of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, see infra Part IX.
90. This fusion has, in part, provided inspiration for English law to achieve the same
fusion. Australia followed the U.S. lead in this regard. See Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd.
v. Maher, 1988, 164 C.L.R. 387 [38].
91. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
92. See id. ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
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estoppel could constitute a cause of action, the Willistonian solu-
tion radically liberalized the law of estoppel and rendered the dis-
tinctions between proprietary estoppel and the other kinds of es-
toppel irrelevant in American law.
V. JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE: THREE POSSIBLE ROUTES
As noted above, at the time of drafting the First Restatement,
Williston and the other Restaters faced a major problem when
outlining the basis of promissory obligations.93 The problem was
what to do with the case law that demonstrated the enforcement
of unbargained-for promises if the bargain theory of consideration
was maintained in the Restatement. 94 There were three possible
routes the Restaters could have taken respecting the granting of
relief for justifiable reliance on unbargained-for promises.
First, the Restaters could have defined consideration broadly to
include acts of reliance upon promises as constituting considera-
tion. This was Corbin's preferred definition.95 Hence Corbin
wrote:
Indeed, there are many cases justifying the statement that consid-
eration may consist of acts of reliance upon a promise even though
they were not specified as the agreed equivalent and inducement,
provided the promisor ought to have foreseen that such action would
take place and the promisee reasonably believes it to be desired.
96
Williston briefly considered this possibility as one with some
"intrinsic merit" but he quickly discarded it because "it should be
recognized that if [such a definition is] generally applied[,] it
would much extend liability on promises, and that at present it is
opposed to the great weight of authority."97 As we have already
seen, this same objection (that a definition of consideration that
enforcement of the promise.").
93. See supra Part II.
94. See id.
95. See GILMORE, supra note 3, at 61-65; see also, Daniel J. Klau, Note, What Price
Certainty? Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of Contracts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 511, 531-
37 (1990).
96. WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 124 n.1 (Arthur L. Cor-
bin ed., 3d American ed. 1919).
97. WILLISTON, supra note 54, § 139, at 313. Williston also stated, "[nior has the law
generally accepted the principle that reliance on a gratuitous promise makes the promise
binding." Id. § 116, at 249.
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included the reliance principle would unwarrantedly extend con-
tractual liability) was voiced by Justice Holmes.9" He repeated it
from the bench in the case of Commonwealth v. Scituate Savings
Bank,99 where he said: "It would cut up the doctrine of considera-
tion by the roots, if a promisee could make a gratuitous promise
binding by subsequently acting in reliance on it." °0
A second alternative open to the Restaters in dealing with the
problem of justifiable reliance was to synthesize the various
classes of cases in which courts had granted relief to justifiably
relied on, but unbargained-for promises into one principle which
would form a general exception to the bargain principle of prom-
issory obligation. This, of course, was Williston's preferred
method.'0 ' Needless to say, it was this Willistonian solution that
prevailed. It was reflected in the First Restatement in section 90
(which was presented as a substitute to section 75 (defining con-
sideration)).'02 This Willistonian solution is also reflected in mod-
ern American contract law. 103
A third alternative would have been to leave the "traditional"
definition of consideration intact in terms of benefit and detri-
ment and then couple that definition with a number of enumer-
ated exceptions. This is the position as it stands under English
law today.'04 English law has stuck with the "traditional" defini-
tion of consideration.0 5 English courts do not insist on the re-
quirement that the parties must have regarded something as con-
sideration at the time of contracting for it to be treated as such.' 0
English courts "often regard an act or forbearance as the consid-
98. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
99. 137 Mass. 301 (1884).
100. Id. at 302; see also Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386-87
(1903) (Wherein Justice Holmes again used his "reciprocal conventional inducement" test
of consideration to dismiss a claim by a railway company that had begun construction of a
railway in reliance on a statute giving tax relief to any person who built such a railway.
When the statute was repealed and the railway company brought a suit based on the con-
stitutional guarantee against the impairment of contractual obligation, Justice Holmes
held that there was no constitutional breach because there was no contract in the first
place; the railway company had given no consideration for the undertaking.).
101. See supra Part III.
102. See Eric Holmes, Four Phases, supra note 9, at 67.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
104. See GUENTER TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 67-161 (11th ed. 2003).
105. Id. at 67-69.
106. Id. at 71.
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eration for a promise even though it may not have been the object
of the promisor to secure it."' °7
Treatise-writer Guenter Treitel terms this practice "inventing
consideration" where a court regards the possibility of some
prejudice to the promisee as a detriment without regard to the
question whether it has in fact been suffered.' 8 The practice of
"inventing consideration" is only made possible by the "tradi-
tional" definition of consideration because this definition does not
require the parties to have treated the consideration as consid-
eration at the time of their contract."0 9 This practice, however,
lessens or eliminates the need for a separate reliance-based con-
tractual doctrine because a court can "invent" consideration to
find a contractual relationship to alleviate the hardships suffered
by a party who relied on an unbargained-for promise."0 Indeed,
subsequent justifiable reliance provides evidence that there was a
possibility that the prejudice would be suffered at the time the
unbargained-for promise was given. That possibility then counts
as sufficient consideration. Also, under English law, "a request
will be implied whenever it can be inferred that the promisor in-
tended that his promise should induce the other to do some act or
forbearance on the faith of it.""' The bargain theory of considera-
tion, however, made these judicial sleights of hand unavailable
for American courts.
The conventional wisdom is that Williston was overly inter-
ested in unifying the law of contract so that when he was alerted
to the existence of cases where promises were not supported by
consideration (as he had defined "consideration" in section 75 of
the Draft First Restatement-in bargain terms), he chose to craft
a new section to deal with such cases rather than expand the defi-
nition of consideration to accommodate such cases." 2 This story
suggests that Williston invented section 90 precisely because he
107. Id. Treitel also cites to cases where courts treated performances or promises as
consideration even though the parties themselves did not think of the performances or
promises as such. Id. at 71 n.40.
108. Id. But see P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS IN CONTRACT 182-83 (1986) (refuting that this is
the English position and accusing Guenter Treitel of "inventing" the category of "invented
consideration").
109. TREITEL, supra note 104, at 71.
110. Id.
111. A.T. Denning, Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Consideration, 15 MOD. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1952).
112. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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wanted to limit the spread of such cases that were decided on
non-bargain basis. In other words, to the extent that most of
these cases were decided on a theory that reliance on a promise
could, under certain circumstances, constitute consideration, Wil-
liston wanted to retard the development of the principle of justifi-
able reliance. Kevin Teeven has urged:
The generalized language in section 90 was open to the possibility of
commercial promises being covered; Williston certainly knew that
commercial promisees had received reliance relief because many of
the unannotated cases included in his treatise's footnotes involved
commercial promises. Despite the open language in section 90, how-
ever, he did not articulate its applicability to commercial promises in
his commentary to the ALI nor did he encourage such use in any of
his writings. He left the actual scope of section 90 up in the air for
the reader of the published version in 1932 since, unlike many of the
Restatement's sections, he provided no comments or reporter's notes.
He claimed that section 90 "states a broader general rule than has
often been laid down," but, if anything, he discouraged a liberal ap-
plication of section 90. He dampened expectations by saying that sec-
tion 90 does not assert a "sweeping rule" that reliance is sufficient
support for a promise. . . . [Tihe sheer fact that the Restatement
edged justifiable reliance out of the mainstream doctrine of consid-
eration diminished its availability and relegated it to an exceptional
equitable role. 
113
If it is true that Williston was seriously interested in retarding
or blunting the development of reliance relief of promissory obli-
gations, then Williston could not have chosen a worse concept
than "estoppel" to ground the new section 90 of the First Restate-
ment. Rather than enumerate exceptions to the consideration
principle, Williston was adamant that the First Restatement
should "generalize" the principles illustrated in the disparate
cases which enforced promises unsupported by consideration.'14
By this very insistence, he was laying the ground for the expan-
sion of the doctrine in section 90 rather than limiting it. As
widely cast as it was, section 90 could have found employment by
courts inclined to do substantive justice in specific fact scenarios
where the rigid application of the doctrine of consideration
worked harsh results. 115
113. Teeven, supra note 4, at 532-33 (internal citations omitted).
114. See A.L.I. Commentaries, supra note 51, at 20; ALL. Proceedings, supra note 44,
at 86.
115. Knapp, supra note 16, at 1197. As early as 1948, Orvill C. Snyder called section 90
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As noted above, when it was suggested to Williston that the
new doctrine should be called "equitable estoppel," he objected
vehemently.116 His reason for the objection was that "equitable"
estoppel only applied to misrepresentation of existing facts.'17 In
fact, there was another reason for such an objection: equitable es-
toppel does not give rise to a cause of action as the new doctrine
contemplated."' In other words, the new doctrine was a lot more
expansive than the doctrine of estoppel as it existed in Anglo-
American law at the time. If Williston was in fact opposed to the
new doctrine, he unwittingly fueled its growth by founding it on
the jurisprudence of estoppel and calling it "promissory estop-
pel."" 9 Williston was not merely modifying one key element of the
doctrine-the requirement that the misrepresentation must be of
present facts-he was transforming the whole doctrine from a
"shield" to a "sword." While equitable estoppel could not under
the then extant legal doctrines found a cause of action, the new
Willistonian estoppel could now found a cause of action.
Thus, if Williston was interested merely in limiting the evolv-
ing doctrine, generalizing it in the language of estoppel did not
help his cause at all. English contract law probably has done a
better job of "containing" the explosion of reliance-based contract
theories through its more diffused definition of consideration and
many disparate doctrines enforcing unbargained-for promises
than Williston's attempt at generalizing. 12
0
If we accept the objectives of CLT in contract law as being
aimed at "narrowing the range of contractual liability,"' 2 ' Willis-
ton would have served the ends of CLT better if he had agreed to
contain the emerging reliance-based doctrine as an exception
within the consideration doctrine. This way, the exceptions would
truly have served the purpose of being the "safety valves" that
Williston intended section 90 to serve.'22 Instead, by generalizing
the "most promiscuous statement of promissory estoppel." Synder, supra note 17, at 27.
116. A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 44, at 89-90.
117. Id.
118. See COOKE, supra note 72, at 118; see also infra Parts VI-VII.
119. A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 44, at 90.
120. See TREITEL, supra note 104, at 67-161.
121. GILMORE, supra note 3, at 21.
122. See A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 44, at 86 ("As someone expressed it, in regard to
this section, if you bind up too closely, with definite mathematical rules the law of consid-
eration, the boiler will burst. You have got to leave the court a certain leeway outside of
those mathematical and exact rules. This section is, so to speak, the safety valve for the
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the emerging principle in section 90, Williston helped transform
estoppel from a rather innocuous evidentiary rule to a potentially
significant rule of substantive law and thereby unwittingly
enlarged the very concept he had hoped to limit. He, therefore,
ended up subverting his beloved definition of consideration. 123 To
understand how the Willistonian formula transformed the law of
estoppel, it is imperative that we briefly recap the classification
and historical development of estoppel in Anglo-American law.
Armed with this information, we will then identify the two main
reasons why the Willistonian formula was a miscalculation.
VI. CLASSIFICATION AND THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF ESTOPPEL
American contracts scholars understood the newly minted doc-
trine of promissory estoppel in contradistinction to what was
termed "equitable" estoppel.'24 In fact, what was meant by "equi-
table estoppel" was "estoppel in pais," and the two terms were
used interchangeably.125 It was also known as "estoppel by con-
duct" or, at times, as "estoppel by representation."'26 All these
terms bear some truth about the nature of the estoppel, but the
term "equitable estoppel" gave the vrong impression-that this
estoppel was founded on equity. In fact, in English law, by the
late nineteenth century, this estoppel had come to be known as
"common law estoppel" rather than "equitable estoppel."127 In-
deed, in English law today, a milder version of the estoppel
known today as "promissory estoppel" in United States jurisdic-
subject of consideration.").
123. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation
of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981) ("[Promissory estoppel] has be-
come perhaps the most radical and expansive development of this century in the law of
promissory liability."); Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Prom-
issory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 474 (1983)
(arguing that promissory estoppel has emerged as an independent cause of action separate
from contract).
124. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 CMT. A (1981) ("Obligations
and remedies based on reliance are not peculiar to the law of contracts. This section is of-
ten referred to in terms of 'promissory estoppel,' a phrase suggesting an extension of the
doctrine of estoppel").
125. See, e.g., Lloyd Pospishil, Equitable Estoppel, 19 NEB. L. BULL. 222, 227-28 (1940);
Teeven, supra note 3, at 22.
126. See, e.g., COOKE, supra note 72, at 18; Charles L.O. Edwards, Note, Equitable Es-
toppel-Estoppel by Representation, 12 OR. L. REV. 316, 317 (1933).
127. See COOKE, supra note 72, at 18-19.
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tions is typically referred to as "equitable estoppel," "equitable
forbearance," or "quasi-estoppel."128
In order to understand the changes Williston wrought on the
law of estoppel, it is important to understand the historical devel-
opment of estoppel. This undertaking is important because it will
help us understand the doctrinal environment in which the draft-
ers of the First Restatement were working. This background will
also enable us to understand both the shift Williston heralded in
the law of estoppel, and how the Willistonian solution facilitated
the evolution of law in this area.
A convenient, but grossly simplified, way to understand the
historical development of estoppel is to begin where Sir Edward
Coke began more than five centuries ago-by subdividing estop-
pel into three main categories. 129 The virtue of beginning here is
that such a classification will help us understand exactly where
the modern American contractual doctrine of promissory estoppel
fits today in the taxonomical development of estoppel. This will,
in turn, assist in making sense of the modern-day arguments we
hear from English jurists and judges about the need to "unify" the
law of estoppel-a proposal which, I argue, has been fueled by the
developments of promissory estoppel in the United States. 3 0
Of the classes of estoppel, Sir Edward Coke said:
Estoppeth cometh of the French word estoupe, from whence the Eng-
lish word stopped: and it is called an estoppel or conclusion, because
a man's own act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to al-
lege or plead the truth .. . [T]here be three kinds of estoppels, viz.
by matter of record, by matter in writing, and by matter in pais. 13l
Let us look at these three types of estoppel in seriatim:
128. The doctrine is "milder" because, unlike the American doctrine of promissory es-
toppel, the English version "does not create new causes of action where none existed be-
fore. It only prevents a party from insisting on his strict legal rights when it would be un-just to allow him to enforce them." Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 K.B. 215, 219 (Denning, L.J.).
129. See EDWARD COKE, A COMMENTARY ON LITTLETON § 352a (photo. reprint 1979)
(19th ed. 1832); 15 EARL OF HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 168 (Viscount Simonds,
ed., 3d ed. 1956).
130. See infra Part X.
131. COKE, supra note 129, at § 352a.
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A. "Estoppel by Matter of Record"' 13 2
This refers to what is known today as estoppel per rem judi-
catam.133 The doctrine of res judicata has roots in the Latin
phrase "res judicata pro veritate accipitur" which literally means
that "a matter adjudged is taken for truth."134 The doctrine signi-
fies a matter in dispute has been considered and settled by a
competent court of justice.135 This is an estoppel only in the sense
that for the two parties who have litigated an issue, "neither the
parties to that proceeding nor those claiming under them, will be
allowed subsequently to controvert the truth of the facts so
found."136 In other words, the finding of the court on that matter
in question is the truth-because the matter adjudged is taken as
truth.
While this type of estoppel was important at the time of draft-
ing the First Restatement (as it remains important today), both its
policy rationale and the nature of the estoppel make it signifi-
cantly different than the other estoppels. The policy rationale for
this estoppel is the necessity of bringing an end to disputes.'37 It
also is triggered by a judicial action, and not-as is true for all
the other estoppels-by the action of one of the parties. It is safe
to conclude that this class of estoppel had little to do with the de-
velopment of promissory estoppel.
B. "Estoppel by Matter in Writing" 3
Commentators agree that what Coke meant by "writing," in the
context of estoppel, was "deed."'39 Hence, this type of estoppel is
132. Id.
133. COOKE, supra note 72, at 6.
134. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (6th ed. 1990).
135. See BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 88 n.2.
136. CABABt, supra note 65, at 2.
137. The Latin maxim frequently used by courts is: Interest reipublice ut sit finis lit-
ium, literally, "[iut concerns the state that there be an end of lawsuits." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 132, at 814; see also BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 88 n.2.
138. COKE, supra note 129, at § 352a.
139. See, e.g., GEORGE SPENCER BOWER & ALEXANDER KINGCOME TURNER, THE LAW
RELATING TO ESTOPPEL BY REPRESENTATION 4 (Alexander Kingcome Turner ed., 2d ed.
1966) ("Coke's second class of estoppel is 'estoppel by matter in writing,' that is, estoppel
by deed, the word 'writing' in the passage cited being undoubtedly intended to indicate a
'writing obligatory' or a document under seal, as appears from the illustrations which he
gives of 'matter in writing.'); BIGELOW supra note 63, at 320; COOKE, supra note 72, at 6;
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commonly called "estoppel by deed."14 Originally, a writing under
a deed was simply a writing under seal.' Today, an instrument
does not need to be under a seal to be a deed as long as the in-
strument is signed by a grantor and clearly expresses the intent
to convey realty.' Estoppel by deed did not allow a party to a
sealed instrument to controvert or contradict the deed by any evi-
dence in any proceedings based on the deed.' This estoppel sup-
plemented the parole evidence rule but operated more rigidly:
So far as a deed is intended to pass, or extinguish a right, it is con-
cluded by its terms. ... There are few rules of law that are better es-
tablished or of greater antiquity than the one which has firmly set-
tled the question, that a man may irrevocably bind himself by
putting his seal to a grant or covenant, and that he will not be al-
lowed to disprove or contradict any declaration or averment con-
tained in the instrument and essential to its purpose. A recital or al-
legation in a deed .. . is conclusive between the parties to the
controversy growing out of the instrument itself or the transaction in
which it was executed. 144
The rationale for estoppel by deed was that a litigant would not
be permitted to deny the validity of her own "solemn" acts to the
detriment of another.14" 5 Another justification was that the court
would presume that a person who took the "solemn" act of execut-
ing a deed had satisfied herself as to the truth of the statements
contained in the deed. 1
46
Estoppel by deed was mainly applied to deeds conveying real
estate and to estoppel as to title. 4 The latter arises from "the
creation of a relationship which involves the grant of a legal right
over property," whereby the grantor is "'preclude[d] from disput-
ing the validity or effect of [her] own grant."' 14' However, the es-
JOHN S. EWART, AN ExPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ESTOPPEL BY MISREPRESENTATION,
1 (1900).
140. See, e.g., BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 320; CABABR, supra note 65, at 2.
141. BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 320.
142. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bums, 203 U.S. 120, 125 (1906); Riggs v. City of New Castle, 78
A. 1037, 1037-38 (Pa. 1911).
143. HENRY M. HERMAN, THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 231 (Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1871).
144. Id. at 231-32.
145. Id.
146. CABABE, supra note 65, at 2-3.
147. HERMAN, supra note 143, at 232.
148. COOKE, supra note 72, at 8 (quoting First Nat'l Bank PLC v. Thompson, [1996]
Ch. 231, 237).
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toppel arises in modern cases mainly as an estoppel by the con-
vention of the parties.'49 This arises where parties agree, in a
formal writing, to admit as true, or to assume the truth of, certain
facts as the conventional basis upon which they have entered into
contractual or other mutual relations. 50
An example of estoppel by the convention of the parties is pro-
vided by the English case of Burroughs Adding Machine, Ltd. v.
Aspinall."'5 In this case, the parties, in an express term in their
written contract, provided that "[a]ll statements of account sent
by the company to the salesman shall be deemed to be accepted
by the salesman as correct unless within 30 days" he shall notify
the company of the non-acceptance of them. 152 The salesman rou-
tinely received statements of accounts and never objected to
any. 1 3 When he later attempted to dispute some of the state-
ments, he was held disentitled from doing so by virtue of this es-
toppel.'54
Estoppel by deed may properly be termed a "formal" estoppel
because it does not require the belief of the person receiving the
representation in the assumed state of facts.'55 It is immaterial
whether the person receiving the representation believes it to be
true or not-such person need only believe that the representa-
tion will be treated as true. 156 It has been said, therefore, that
this estoppel operates as a rule of law as opposed to a principle of
equity.'57 This is because this estoppel does not implicate the dis-
cretionary power of judges to do equity. 5 ' Neither is reliance on
the truth of the representation a necessary element in establish-
ing its applicability.'59 Lastly, the parties' state of mind is irrele-
vant in establishing whether the estoppel applies or not.160 As we
will see shortly, all three of these factors are crucial to establish-
ing a right to relief by estoppel in pais. In turn, it is these three
149. BOWER & TURNER, supra note 139, at 146.
150. Id.
151. 41 T.L.R. 276 (C.A. 1925).
152. Id. at 276.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See BOWER & TURNER, supra note 139, at 147; COOKE, supra note 72, at 8.
156. See BOWER & TURNER, supra note 139, at 147.
157. See COOKE, supra note 72, at 13.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id.
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factors that endeared estoppel in pais to Williston and other
American courts seeking to enforce unbargained-for promises.
C. "Estoppel by Matter in Pais"'161
At the time of Coke, estoppel in pais consisted of acts that were
by "liverie, by entry . . . by acceptance of an estate."162 Cabab6
long ago claimed that by dint of these old acts estoppel in pais is
obsolete.163 Bigelow and Ewart, however, both argue that estop-
pel by acceptance of 'rent still prevails, though it has changed
character. 164 Suffice it to say, the most important development in
the law of estoppel occurred through the extension of this class of
estoppel. While at the time of Coke, estoppel in pais was only a
consequence of the three narrow formal actions (livery, entry and
partition-and later, acceptance of estate), courts of equity soon
started using the logic of this class of estoppel to extend the doc-
trine.'65 The logic was that a party was estopped from denying
that which the party had indicated to another, through conduct or
words, to be true if the other party had suffered detriment follow-
ing such representation. 166 When thus extended by the courts of
equity, this estoppel came to be known as "common law estop-
pel."167 This explains the nomenclature "equitable" that still at-
taches to this class of estoppel. 161
161. COKE, supra note 129, at § 352a.
162. Id.
163. CABABE, supra note 65, at 3-4.
164. BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 446; EWART, supra note 139, at 1.
165. See BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 445-47.
166. See, e.g., Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 174, 174, 31 Eng. Rep. 998, 998 (Ch. 1801).
167. COOKE, supra note 72, at 18-19.
168. Pospishil, supra note 123, at 228 n.30 ("In a note to Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2
Smith Leading Cas. [711], it is said that the doctrine of estoppel in pais originated in
chancery but is now adopted in courts of law. This is contrary to what seems to be histori-
cally true. Estoppel in pais during the time of Coke embraced estoppels by livery, by entry,
by acceptance of rent, by partitions, and by acceptance of an estate. These, as it has been
seen, were recognized and acted upon at common law. It would seem therefore, that estop-
pel in pais originated in the common law courts to do justice, but that it was later taken
over by the equity tribunals to develop what is now known as 'equitable estoppel,' this has
displaced the estoppel in pais of Lord Coke's time."). Vice Chancellor Bacon also explained
the origins of the doctrine as:
The common law doctrine of estoppel was, as I have said, a device which the
Common Law Courts resorted to at a very early period to strengthen and
lengthen their arm, and not venturing to exercise an equitable jurisdiction
over the subject before them, they did convert their own special pleading tac-
tics into instruments by which they could obtain an end which the Court of
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In this expanded version, estoppel was re-introduced in the
common-law courts of England.'69 The case that clearly and un-
mistakably enunciated the principle in common law was Pickard
v. Sears decided in 1837.17' This was an action of trover for ma-
chinery. 171 The plaintiff was the mortgagee to the machinery and
did not disclose the fact of the mortgage to the defendant, who
purchased the machinery for value and in good faith without no-
tice of the mortgage. 172 As a defense to the action, the defendant
asserted that the plaintiff had, by his conduct, induced the defen-
dant to believe that he had acquired clear title to the machinery
and should therefore not be permitted to dispute the same. 173 The
King's Bench gave a decision in favor of the defendant. 174 Lord
Chief Justice Denman stated the rule thus:
[Wihere one by his words or conduct willfully causes another to be-
lieve the existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act
on that belief, so as to alter his previous position, the former is con-
cluded from averring against the latter a different state of things as
existing at the same time. 
175
Not unlike Samuel Williston almost a century later, Lord Den-
man did not give a name to the "rule" he originated in Pickard.
Indeed, he does not use the word "estoppel" anywhere in the deci-
sion. However, in the broad statement he made, he laid the foun-
Chancery, without any foreign assistance, did at all times, and I hope will at
all times, put into force in order to do justice. But the doctrine of estoppel is
purely legal.
Keate v. Phillips, 18 Ch. D. 561, 577 (1881). However, Bigelow seems to believe that the
origins of the doctrine were in equity, not common law. See BIGELOW, supra note 63, at
445-47.
169. See BIGELOW, supra note 62, at 446.
170. 6 Ad. & El. 469; Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1837). However, an argument has been made
that the concept of "equitable estoppel" as "estoppel by representation" was first intro-
duced in the common law courts almost a century earlier by Lord Mansfield in Montefiori
v. Montefiori, 1 Black W. 363, 96 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1762). See COOKE, supra note 72, at
20. Bigelow says that although the principle of "equitable estoppel" had been foreshad-
owed and applied in earlier cases at common law, Pickard v. Sears "was the case in which,
after the way had been pointed out, fire of the English Chancery was stolen, carried away,
and permanently appropriated." BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 544.
171. In common law practice, an action for trover was an action on the case for the re-
covery of damages for wrongful conversion of goods belonging to the plaintiff. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 132, at 1545.
172. See Pickard, 6 Ad. & El. at 470-71, 112 Eng. Rep. at 180.
173. Id. at 473-74, 112 Eng. Rep. at 181.
174. Id. at 474, 112 Eng. Rep. at 181.
175. Id.
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dation of the extension of equitable estoppel. In Pickard, the rule
stated by Lord Denman was a defensive rule: it precluded the
plaintiff from disputing a fact. 176 The consequence of such preclu-
sion was to deny the plaintiffs cause of action any efficacy: if the
plaintiff was not permitted to prove that he was the mortgagee,
then his action in trover had to fail. Soon afterwards, courts in
equity would use the same principle offensively to make good rep-
resentations generally.
This trend is exemplified by the case of Hammersley v. De
Biel.117 This was a case involving a marriage settlement. 7 1 A fa-
ther had, through marriage proposals, induced a suitor to marry
his daughter on the representation that a sum of £10,000 would
be settled upon her and her future children by his last testa-
ment. 179 The plaintiff sought to enforce the settlement against the
father-in-law's estate and was allowed.8 0 In his judgment, Lord
Campbell cited Lord Cottenham with approval and stated that:
"A representation made by one party for the purpose of influenc-
ing the conduct of the other party, and acted on by him, will, in
general, be sufficient to entitle him to the assistance of this Court
for the purpose of realizing such representation."'
The hope that equitable representation, however, would even-
tually be used to make good all representations (subject to the
limitation already imposed by Jorden v. Money-that to be ac-
tionable the representations must respect existing facts, not fu-
ture intention), was soon dashed. It was the case of Low v. Bou-
verie"8' which in 1891 brought this onward expansion of estoppel
to a screeching halt. The plaintiff, in this case, wanted to loan
money to a beneficiary of a trust on the security of the benefici-
ary's life interest in the trust fund.'83 Before loaning the money,
the plaintiff inquired from the trustee about any encumbrances
on the trust fund. 18 4 The trustee reported some encumbrances but
176. 12 C1. & Fin. 45; 8 Eng. Rep. 1312 (H.L. 1845).
177. 12 C1. & Fin. 45; 8 E.R. 1312 (H.L. 1845).
178. Id. at 46-47, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1313.
179. Id. at 45, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1312.
180. Id. at 55, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1317.
181. Id. at 88, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1331.
182. [1891] 3 Ch. 82 (C.A.).
183. Id. at 83.
184. Id. at 107 (Kay, L.J., concurring).
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forgot to report others.18 5 The plaintiff proceeded to loan money
on the faith that the only existing encumbrances were those that
had been reported."8 6 It emerged later, but only after the benefi-
ciary failed to repay the money and the plaintiff sought to realize
the security, that there were other unreported encumbrances." 7
The additional encumbrances made the security inadequate for
the debt the plaintiff had extended to the beneficiary.' 8 The
plaintiff brought an action against the trustee seeking to make
the trustee liable for the total amount due because he had relied
on the trustee's statement of facts, which turned out to be incor-
rect.8 9 For his claim to succeed, the plaintiff would have to rely
on the trustee's misstatement of facts as the basis of his claim for
damages. 90 Since the misstatement was not fraudulent, and the
trustee had no duty to take care in responding to inquiries such
as the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeal refused to let the plaintiff
use the misstatement as the basis of his cause of action.191 All the
assistance the plaintiff could get from estoppel would be to estop
the trustee "from denying the truth of something which he has
said"-but that in itself was not a legal basis for a claim for dam-
ages. 192 As Lord Justice Bowen famously explained:
But we must be guarded in the way in which we understand the
remedy where there is an estoppel. Estoppel is only a rule of evi-
dence; you cannot found an action upon estoppel. Estoppel is only
important as being one step in the progress towards relief on the hy-
pothesis that the defendant is estopped from denying the truth of
something which he has said. 1
93
While, as we will see shortly, Jorden v. Money' 94 and its prog-
eny restricted the enforcement of equitable estoppel to misrepre-
sentations of existing facts (as opposed to representations of fu-
185. See id. at 84-85.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 85.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 85-86.
190. See id. at 87.
191. See id. at 105 ("[Tlhere is no duty enforceable at law to be careful in the represen-
tation which is made. Negligent misrepresentafion does not certainly amount to deceit,
and negligent misrepresentation can only amount to a cause of action if there exist (sic) a
duty to be careful-not to give information except after careful inquiry.") (Bowen, L.J.).
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. 5 H.L.C. 185, 10 Eng. Rep. 868 (H.L. 1854).
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ture intentions), Low restricted the estoppel's role to a defensive
one. Equitable estoppel could no longer be used as a cause of ac-
tion. The most the remedy could do would be to "preclude[] [the
defendant] from denying the truth of the fact which he is sup-
posed to have asserted."' 19
5
VII. WILLISTON'S MISCALCULATIONS: WHY WILLISTON
FAILED TO CONTAIN PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
There are at least three reasons why Williston's attempts to
limit the expansion of section 90 of the First Restatement were
doomed to fail. First, by tightening section 75 of the First Re-
statement, he only made it more likely that courts would latch
onto section 90 as the "safety valve," thereby enlarging promis-
sory estoppel rather than attempting to "fit" the cases within sec-
tion 75.196 Second, his assertion that reliance-based theories were
only used in enforcing gratuitous promises was historically inac-
curate.197 Third, by freeing his newly minted estoppel from the
constraints of evidentiary law and placing it alongside proprie-
tary estoppel as a rule of substantive law, he laid the ground for a
more ubiquitous use of the doctrine.19 In this part, I discuss in
detail the last two reasons.
To be fair, Williston seemed aware of the dangers of hoisting
the new section 90 onto the estoppel doctrine. He objected to the
use of "equitable estoppel" but allowed it to be called "promissory
estoppel."'99 He also complained that judges had the habit of call-
ing anything and everything "estoppel."2 0 He thus fastidiously
avoided calling the new section estoppel, but the language he
used too closely paralleled the language used in estoppel cases,
but without the leash that Low v. Bouverie had placed on the use
of the doctrine-that it could not be used as a cause of action. °1
195. Low, [1891] 3 Ch. at 106.
196. See A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 44, at 86.
197. See generally Teeven, supra note 4 (describing the development of promissory es-
toppel).
198. Infra Part V.
199. A.L.I. Proceedings, supra note 44, at 89-90.
200. See id.
201. See infra Part VII.
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By the time Williston and the other Restaters were writing the
First Restatement, American contract law closely paralleled and
followed English contract law. This meant that the cases which
were used to persuade Williston that unbargained-for promises
were occasionally enforced by some American courts would also
have been enforced under English law (except charitable sub-
scription cases-which were often enforced on restitution
grounds).202 After the writing of the First Restatement, American
law diverged substantially from English law by enlarging the
scope of enforceable unbargained-for promises. In this regard, de-
spite the charge of the Restaters "to state clearly and precisely in
the light of the decisions the principles and rules of the common
law,"20 3 section 90 of the First Restatement ended up doing more
than mirroring the law as it existed. It transformed the law.
Without section 90, for example, it is unlikely that unbar-
gained-for promises A la Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.204 would
have been enforceable under a contractual theory. The newly
minted principle of promissory estoppel combined with the pecu-
liarly American duty to negotiate in good faith to produce results
such as Hoffman.2"5 What this means is that Williston's concep-
202. English courts never enforced charitable subscriptions, even as exceptions to the
consideration doctrine. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 54 L.J. Ch. 811, 811 (1885); In re Cory 29
T.L.R. 18, 18 (Ch. 1912). However, many American jurisdictions had, even before the
emergence of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, enforced charitable subscriptions on a
variety of theories. See, e.g., Cottage St. Methodist Episcopal Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass.
528, 530 (1877) (holding there is consideration in the subsequent acts of the promisee);
Keuka College v. Ray, 60 N.E. 325, 326-27 (N.Y. 1901) (holding where money has been
spent or liabilities incurred, the court will import an implied promise to meet the obliga-
tion).
203. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, at xi (1932).
204. 133 N.W.2d 267, 272-73 (Wis. 1965). The court frames one of the issues on appeal
as "[wihether this court should recognize causes of action grounded on promissory estoppel
as exemplified by sec. 90 of Restatement, 1 Contracts." Id. See generally Metzger & Phil-
lips, supra note 123, at 474-75 (discussing the development of promissory estoppel as a
cause of action).
205. English law does not recognize an implied duty to negotiate in good faith. See
TREITEL, supra note 104, at 60. Treitel cites the English case of Walford v. Miles [1992] 2
A.C. 128, 138 (H.L.), as authority for this position. Id. In Walford, Lord Ackner, in a
speech in which the rest of the House of Lords concurred, stated:
However the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inher-
ently repugnant to the adverserial position of the parties when involved in
negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her)
own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations. To advance
that interest he must be entitled, if he thinks it appropriate, to threaten to
withdraw from further negotiations or to withdraw in fact, in the hope that
the opposite party may seek to reopen the negotiations by offering him im-
proved terms .... duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice
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tualization of section 90 of the First Restatement ultimately
proved not to be a constraint on the full "equitable" promise of its
underlying principle-but to unshackle it from potential restric-
tions.
So, how could Williston have managed to do what, if we are to
believe Gilmore and Teeven, he was so avowedly against? Here,
we discuss in detail two possible explanations.
A. Williston Believed Section 90 Would Be Restricted to
Gratuitous Promises
When he drafted section 90 of the First Restatement, Williston
believed that it would be restricted to gratuitous promises only-
and not to promises given in a commercial setting.2 °6 This is be-
cause he believed that courts had granted relief for unbargained-
for promises only in cases where such promises were gratuitous.
Professor Kevin M. Teeven has persuasively shown, through me-
ticulous historical analysis, that Williston was, in fact, inaccurate
in his claim that courts had primarily only granted justifiable re-
liance relief on gratuitous promises.0 7
Even though Williston was mistaken that justifiable reliance
had been used as a basis for contractual relief, he was not en-
tirely mistaken. He derived this belief from the then existing con-
ceptualization of estoppel by misrepresentation. Since most of the
courts that granted relief for justifiable reliance had used lan-
guage analogous to the estoppel doctrine, it was only logical that
Williston would use the estoppel lens to analyze these cases.20 ' By
dint of the existing jurisprudence of reliance-based estoppel, Wil-
liston was right in concluding that the doctrine could not be used
to protect a party which could otherwise have protected itself by
contract.20 9 Estoppel by misrepresentation was used to protect an
as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party.
Walford, [1992] 2 A.C. at 138.
On the other hand, American law has been more willing to accept that such a duty to
negotiate in good faith exists. See, e.g., Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, 795 F. 2d 291,
292 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that an agreement to negotiate in good faith is enforceable in
Pennsylvania); E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agree-
ments: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987).
206. See WILLISTON, supra note 54, § 96, at 307-13.
207. See Teeven, supra note 4, at 528-31.
208. WILLISTON, supra note 54, § 96, at 307-13.
209. BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 555; CABAflM, supra note 65, at 59; LANCELOT
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innocent party who relied, to her detriment, on a representation
made to her when the "person who made it or his privies seek to
deny its truth and to deprive the party who has acted upon it of
the benefit obtained."21 ° Estoppel by misrepresentation was not
intended to protect a party who could otherwise protect itself by
contract." This was the explanation for the rigid requirement
that an estoppel by representation only arose where the misrep-
resentation was one of facts, not of future intention or promise.212
The leading treatise on estoppel at the time Williston was draft-
ing the First Restatement says of this rigid requirement:
The representation or concealment must, in the second place, like a
recital, in all ordinary cases have reference to a present or past state
of things; for if a party make a representation concerning something
in the future it must generally be either a mere statement of inten-
tion or opinion, uncertain to the knowledge of both parties, or it will
come to a contract with the peculiar consequences of a contract. 213
Speaking specifically about unbargained-for promises, Cabab6,
writing in 1888, similarly wrote:
Even if a party has gone so far as to promise to do something, he is
not bound to fulfill such promise, however much other parties may
have acted on the faith thereof, unless there be a consideration for
his promise; and to invoke the doctrine of estoppel for the purpose of
compelling a party to do that which he has expressed an intention of
doing, or made a naked promise to do, is to use it for the purpose of
enlarging by a side wind the boundaries of contractual obligation;
when the elements necessary for the formation of a contract are
wanting, but could (if the parties had so wished) have been sup-
plied. "
Estoppel was never meant to protect the indolent or the incom-
petent. Thus, if a party could have protected itself with a con-
tract, estoppel would not be used to protect her. This was be-
FEILDING EVEREST, THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 279 (3d ed. 1923).
210. BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 543.
211. EVEREST, supra note 209, at 279 ("A party cannot turn what is in its nature a
mere promise into a contract, by simply asserting that on the faith of the promise certain
things were done by him; that is to say, he cannot turn a promise into a contract by rei in-
terventus, so to speak.").
212. See, e.g., Jorden v. Money, 5 H.L.C. 185, 223-24, 10 Eng. Rep. 868, 885 (H.L.
1854); BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 555-59; CABAB, supra note 65, at 58-60; EVEREST, su-
pra note 209, at 279-81.
213. BIGELOW, supra note 63, at 555 (citations omitted).
214. CABABS, supra note 65, at 59.
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cause, under CLT's ethos of individualistic self-reliance, reliance
could never be reasonable unless a party had concluded a bargain
in which the party exchanged something for the promise. 215 The
only aspect of the estoppel doctrine Williston consciously thought
he was tinkering with was acknowledging that at times a party
might not have had an opportunity or means to protect itself from
a representation. It follows that a party would only be in such a
situation (i.e., not able to protect itself from a representation)
where the promise given by the other party was gratuitous rather
than one entered into in the commercial or exchange context.
This explains why Williston was at pains to explain that section
90 of the First Restatement reflected decisions in cases that had
been decided in the areas of intra-family promissory gifts, mar-
riage settlement, charitable subscriptions, and gratuitous agen-
cies-all areas characterized by gratuitous promises in situations
where a bargain was not contemplated.216 Since the promisees in
these instances could not protect themselves by bargaining, it
was right for the law to come in to aid them if they suffered det-
riment in reliance on the promises.
The only way, however, Williston could permit the doctrine of
estoppel to aid such promisees was by relaxing the rigid require-
ment that, for an estoppel to arise, the representation relied on
must have been one of an existing or a past state of facts.217 By
relaxing that rule, all reasonably relied-on representations-be
they of existing facts or future intentions-could give rise to an
estoppel.218 It is important to understand that what Williston and
the Restaters were proposing here was in fact a significant
change in the law of estoppel.
Since the mid-nineteenth century, English law had been cate-
gorical that the "doctrine [of estoppel] does not apply to a case
where the representation is not a representation of a fact, but a
statement of something which the party intends or does not in-
tend to do."21 9 This was emphatically stated by the House of
215. See Metzger & Phillips, supra note 123, at 502 ("[Plromisees who relied without
the protection of an enforceable bargain might have been deemed morally unworthy of
recompense due to their foolishness.").
216. See WILLISTON, supra note 54, § 139, at 494-502.
217. See Jorden, 5 H.L.C. at 215-16, 10 Eng. Rep. at 882; BIGELOW, supra note 63, at
555-59; CABABt, supra note 65, at 58-60; EVEREST, supra note 209, at 279-81.
218. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
219. Jorden, 5 H.L.C. at 214-15, 10 Eng. Rep. at 882.
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Lords in Jorden v. Money. 220 As Elizabeth Cooke noted, the effect
of the decision in Jorden ensured that the doctrine of estoppel
could not form a general principle of reliance-based promise en-
forcement.22' The House of Lords subsequently made this clear in
Maddison v. Alderson2 2 where Lord Chancellor Earl of Selborne
stated:
I have always understood it to have been decided in Jorden v. Money
that the doctrine of estoppel by representation is applicable only to
representations as to some state of facts alleged to be at the time ac-
tually in existence, and not to promises de futuro, which, if binding
at all, must be binding as contracts .... 223
Williston's section 90, however, explicitly sought to change this
long-standing principle. Yet, in accord with the existing estoppel
jurisprudence, Williston hoped that this expansion of the doctrine
would only apply to gratuitous promises. If Williston was secretly
hoping, however, that the doctrinal history of the doctrine of es-
toppel would limit its application to gratuitous and gift contexts,
he was sorely mistaken. Once he had returned the stream of es-
toppel to its pre-Jorden course, there was simply no means of re-
directing some of its waters to the post-Jorden course by distin-
guishing promises made in the commercial setting from those
made in a non-commercial setting. Attempts by some classically-
minded judges to limit the application of section 90 of the First
Restatement to gratuitous promises were soon overrun by the
great weight of realist judges who saw no utility in such formal,
conceptual distinctions.224
220. Id.
221. COOKE, supra note 72, at 23.
222. 8 App. Cas. 467 (H.L. 1883).
223. Id. at 473. The requirement that an estoppel can only rest on representations of
existing facts was consistently approved by various English courts, including Chadwick v.
Manning, [1896] A.C. 231, 232, 238-39 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.S.W.) (Macnaghten,
L.J.), and In re Fickus, [1900] 1 Ch. 331, 334 (Ch.) (Cozens-Hardy, J.).
224. See Steve Allen Ungerman, Note, Extension of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
into Bargained-for Transactions, 20 Sw. L.J. 656, 656, 661 (1966). Compare Drennan v.
Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (holding that when a general contractor had re-
lied on a subcontractor's bid in computing her own bid, the subcontractor would not be
permitted to revoke her bid, even though the general contractor had not yet accepted the
subcontractor's bid), with James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933)
(holding, on a remarkably similar set of facts, that the general contractor could not suc-
ceed on a theory of promissory estoppel because there was no "promise" in an offer; the
court noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel had been used "chiefly" in cases in-
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B. Williston Unwittingly Liberalized the Doctrine of Estoppel
Second, in his conceptualization of section 90, Williston did not
take into account that estoppel had hitherto been held only to be
a rule of evidence and not a rule of substantive law.225
Despite the trend towards liberalization of the requirements
for an estoppel action in American courts in the late nineteenth to
early twentieth century-a trend which led Williston to focus on
only one of the two key limitations of the doctrine of estoppel as it
existed in common law-several courts in American jurisdictions
had clearly held that an estoppel could not give rise to a cause of
action.
A clear example is the case of Berry v. Massachusetts Bonding
& Insurance Co.226 decided in 1920. In this case, an employer's li-
ability insurance was issued to "Thomas J. Berry, doing business
as Berry Iron & Steel Company." 227 In the policy, the assured was
described as an "individual. ' 228 During the coverage period, T.J.
Berry died but not before he conveyed his business, a foundry, to
C.R. Berry. 229 Neither the insurance company nor its branch of-
fice was officially informed of the death and conveyance, although
the local insurance broker who originally sold the policy to T.J.
Berry and a local attorney who handled insurance claims on be-
half of the insurance company knew of the death by virtue of liv-
ing in the same locale as T.J. Berry. 230 From the time of the issu-
ance of the policy, including the time after the death of T.J. Berry
and conveyance of the business to C.R. Berry, reports of accidents
were sent to the insurance company on blank paper supplied by
the insurance company.231 These reports were usually transmit-
ted to the insurance broker, who, in turn, conveyed them to the
insurance company.23 2 The insurance company received these re-
ports and, in the three occasions where suits were filed, assumed
volving charitable subscriptions).
225. Low v. Bouverie, [1891] 3 Ch. 2 82, 105 (C.A.).
226. 221 S.W. 748 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920).
227. Id. at 748 (quoting the insurance policy).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 749.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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the defense of the suits.233 The insurance company later withdrew
from defense of the suits, however, and informed the new owners
of the foundry business that it would not honor the policy because
the policy had been issued to an individual, T.J. Berry, who was
deceased.234 It was clear that there was no contract between the
insurance company and C.R. Berry and his assigns in the foundry
business, the new owners, since the policy had been issued to T.J.
Berry as an "individual," "'doing business as Berry Iron & Steel
Company.' 235 The new owners therefore argued that the insur-
ance company was "'estopped to deny that there was any contrac-
tual relation existing between them" because the insurance com-
pany had led the plaintiffs to believe that such an insurance
contract existed between them and the company by receiving re-
ports of the accidents after T.J. Berry's death and in assuming
the defense of the suits based on accidents which had occurred af-
ter T.J. Berry's death.236
The court held for the defendants, not on the ground that there
was no "promise" in the conduct of the defendants in receiving the
accident reports and assuming defense of the suits, but on the le-
gal ground that even if the plaintiffs had established an estoppel,
such an estoppel could not found a cause of action:
[W]e know of no case wherein estoppel "alone" has been permitted to
"create" a cause of action. A cause of action must have its foundation
either in a contract or in an actionable wrong done. There is nothing
in the petition or in the evidence tending to show a wrong done, or a
cause of action arising ex delicto. In the case at bar the right as-
serted is something having no relation to a wrong and, in the very
nature of things, is one that can hardly arise except through a con-
tractual relationship .... "An estoppel does not in itself give a cause
of action.
" 23 7
233. Id. at 749-50.
234. Id. at 750.
235. See id.
236. Id. The plaintiffs argued that:
We are not limiting ourselves to the terms of that policy; if we did, we
couldn't recover; we are not attempting to recover by contract; it is by estop-
pel.... The insurance company should be held liable ... not on the ground
that it was bound by contract to do so, but by reason of its conduct and by
reason of its having assumed that responsibility.
Id. at 751.
237. Id. at 751 (quoting Seton v. Lafone, 19 Q.B.D. 68, 70 (1887)).
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It is noteworthy that in reaching this conclusion, the court relies
heavily on English decisions.238
American commentators during the period when the First Re-
statement was being drafted also seemed equally aware of the fact
that equitable estoppel could not found a cause of action. For ex-
ample, Silas Alward wrote in the pages of Harvard Law Review in
1905 that: "Not being a cause of action, the measure of damage in
the application of this doctrine [of equitable estoppel] is not com-
pensation, but the placing of the one relying upon it in the same
position as if the representation, or assumed state of facts, were
true. 239
As such, Williston liberalized promissory estoppel by unshack-
ling it from its evidentiary moorings, allowing it to drift into the
sea of substantive obligations. While Williston did advertently
think of the new promissory doctrine as tinkering with the ele-
ment of "representation," he did not advertently think of the new
doctrine as changing the very nature of the estoppel by making it
a basis for a cause of action. So, in the aftermath of the formula-
tion of section 90 of the First Restatement, litigants could simply
found a cause of action on an unbargained-for promise whereby in
the past, they would have had to:
1) either rely on a different cause of action (using estoppel only
in aid of their position by estopping the other party from contest-
ing the veracity of what the party had earlier represented to be
true); or
2) bring their claim under one of the "exceptions" to the rule
that consideration was required to enforce a promise.
In Williston's new world, a party could simply use the unbar-
gained-for promise as her substantive cause of action. To be sure,
this was not completely unknown even under English law, but,
only proprietary estoppel could be a basis of a cause of action.24 °
What became known as "promissory estoppel" could only act as a
substantive source of rights in very limited circumstances--one of
which is an existing contractual relationship between the parties.
238. The court directly cites, quotes, and relies on the Court of Appeal's decisions in
Seton, 19 Q.B.D. at 70, and Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B.D. 491, 497-97.
239. Silas Alward, A New Phase of Equitable Estoppel, 19 HARv. L. REV. 113, 113
(1905).
240. See COOKE, supra note 72, at 118.
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Thus, Williston helped hasten three tremendous legal devel-
opments simultaneously. First, he "naturalized" the definition of
consideration in bargain terms. Second, and more significantly,
his preferred definition of consideration spawned a need for a
"safety valve" in the form of a separate doctrine to tamper the
harshness wrought by his preferred definition of consideration-
the doctrine of "promissory estoppel." To be clear, a broader defi-
nition of consideration would have made it unnecessary to come
up with a second doctrine as a basis for enforceable promises. Fi-
nally, in cobbling together this "new" doctrine, Williston borrowed
from existing ideas in English law but also clearly considered
himself less constrained by the contours of the estoppel doctrine
as it had developed under English law. The result was that Wil-
liston "transplanted" the doctrine of promissory estoppel from
English law but "refracted" it to suit the role he wanted it to play
in the United States's contract law.
In the next section, I introduce the concept of legal transplant,
and then briefly rehash the history of promissory estoppel under
English law in order to demonstrate the "refraction" the doctrine
underwent as it crossed the Atlantic Ocean in Williston's concep-
tual ship.
VIII. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS A LEGAL TRANSPLANT:
THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS
A legal transplant is a body of law or individual legal rule that
was copied from a law or rule already in force in another country,
the host country, rather than developed by the local legal com-
munity, the receiving country.241 Differently put, it is "any legal
notion or rule which, after being developed in a 'source' body of
law, is then introduced into another, 'host' body of law."242
Since Alan Watson gave a name to the phenomenon in the
1970s, there has been a raging debate in the literature on
whether "legal transplants" can be engineered or not.243 Watson
241. Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Direc-
tor's Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 887 & n.1 (2003).
242. Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some Prob-
lems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 199 (1994).
243. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANT: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 21-31 (1974) (outlining Professor Watson's theories on how law is transplanted).
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famously argued that legal transplants are the main source of le-
gal change. 2" He argued that "borrowing (with adaptation) has
been the usual way of legal development."2 4' The explanation
Watson gives for the prevalence of legal transplants is that law-
yers prefer to imitate laws and principles from other jurisdictions
rather than react directly to solve societal problems with an
"original" rule or principle.246 Many scholars of comparative law,
however, especially those from the Law and Society school of
thought, believe that legal transplants are impossible. 247 Their
foremost objection to Watson's theory of legal transplant is es-
poused in the following paragraph by Pierre Legrand:
A rule is necessarily an incorporative cultural form. As an accretion
of cultural elements, it is buttressed by important historical and
ideological formations. A rule does not have any empirical existence
that can be significantly detached from the world of meanings that
defines a legal culture; the part is an expression and a synthesis of
the whole: it resonates.
248
This debate is significantly complicated by the lack of a uni-
form meaning to the term "legal transplant. 2 49 Even where
scholars agree on the meaning, there is significant disagreement
on what a "successful" legal transplant is. 250 Finally, there is the
pragmatic question on what the conditions for a "successful" legal
transplant, however defined, actually are.251 The Willistonian
transplantation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel from Eng-
land to the United States provides an excellent opportunity to in-
244. Id. at 7, 95, 99.
245. Id. at 7.
246. See id. at 95, 99.
247. See, e.g., R.B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW, AND DEVELOPMENT 29-48 (1978) (argu-
ing that laws are generally not transferable between different nations); Richard L. Abel,
Law as Lag: Inertia as a Social Theory of Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 785, 794-97 (1982) (re-
viewing ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE, 1977); Lawrence Friedman, Some
Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 93 (David
Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001); Otto Kahn-Freund, On the Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974) (arguing that "we cannot take for granted that
rules or institutions are transplantable" without taking into account national differences
in culture, geography, wealth, religion and other factors).
248. Pierre Legrand, What 'Legal Transplants'?", in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, su-
pra note 247, at 55, 59.
249. See, e.g., Ofiati Inst., Introduction to ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 247,
at 3, 3-6.
250. See David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL
CULTURES, supra note 247, at 7, 37-39.
251. See id. at 39-46.
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vestigate these issues. For example, if one looks at the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as it existed under English law and as it was
transplanted into United States law without taking into consid-
eration the historical context of Willistonian borrowing, one
might conclude that the estoppel was an "unsuccessful" legal
transplant--due to the extent that the doctrine underwent sig-
nificant changes in its American version. Of course, one might in-
terpret this very modification as a sign of "success" of the notion
of estoppel as a legal transplant. 52 To this extent, whether the
estoppel was a successful legal transplant or not depends on one's
perspective and the context.
First, I briefly look at the history of promissory estoppel under
English law. The aim is two-fold. First, this provides an opportu-
nity to assess how "successful" Williston's legal transplant was.
Second, we glean from this history how the "refraction" of the doc-
trine in the United States eventually started influencing further
developments of the doctrine under English law-a case of "re-
verse influence."25 3 At the end of this discussion, I conclude this
article with a few tentative speculations about why the doctrine
of estoppel has been so "successful" as a legal transplant-so
much so that there are calls to re-import it back to England via
some Commonwealth countries, notably Australia.
IX. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN ENGLAND BEFORE THE
FIRST RESTATEMENT (1932)
A. "Promissory Estoppel" Under English Law Before 1932
As we saw in Part VI of this article, the reliance-based estoppel
began with roots in the rather formal estoppel in pais.254 It was
ultimately extended to become a more thorough-going, reliance-
based estoppel through which courts could, and did, fashion
remedies aimed at enforcing representations made so as to rea-
sonably induce action by the representee. This expansion reached
its zenith around the mid-nineteenth century.25 5 We earlier saw
252. See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 243, at 27-29.
253. See Likhovski, supra note 12, at 635 n.55.
254. See supra Part VI.
255. See P.D. Finn, Equitable Estoppel, in ESSAYS IN EQUITY 60, 62-64 (P.D. Finn ed.,
1985).
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that the case that neatly epitomizes this trend of expanding reli-
ance-based estoppel is Hammersley v. De Biel.256 In this case, the
plaintiff sought to enforce a promise by his father-in-law to make
a marriage settlement in reliance on which the plaintiff mar-
ried.257 No cause of action could lie in contract since, clearly, there
was no consideration for the promise.258 Nonetheless, the House
of Lords held the father-in-law's estate liable to pay the amount
promised by the father-in-law.2"9 Lord Campbell cited with ap-
proval Lord Cottenham, who heard the case at first instance, in
laying out what is, perhaps, the broadest statement of promissory
estoppel in England to date: "A representation made by one party
for the purpose of influencing the conduct of another, and acted
on by him, will in general be sufficient to entitle him to the assis-
tance of a Court of Equity, for the purpose of realising such repre-
sentation."26 °
It should be fairly clear this statement by Lord Cottenham,
made in 1845, is essentially the kernel of the promissory estoppel
doctrine as it later emerged and developed in the United States
generally, and in particular, as espoused in section 90 of the First
Restatement.261
Hammersley, then, stood for the then remarkable proposition
that equity would enforce all representations, including represen-
tations of intention, if such representations were made for the
purpose of influencing the conduct of another person, who then
acted in reliance on such representations.262
Only a decade after Hammersley, the House of Lords began
checking this expansion of actionable representations. First, in
Maunsell v. Hedges,263 Lord Cranworth sought to minimize the
256. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
257. See 12 Cl & Fin. 45, 45-47, 8 Eng. Rep. 1312, 1313 (H.L. 1845).
258. See id. at 65, 66, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1322 (Brougham, L., concurring).
259. Id. at 61, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1320.
260. Id. at 88, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1331.
261. This impugns the claim by Justice Cardozo in 1927 that promissory estoppel was a
"new" doctrine. In Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1927), Justice Cardozo says "there has grown up of recent days a doctrine that a
substitute for consideration or an exception to its ordinary requirements can be found in
what is styled 'a promissory estoppel.'" Id. at 175.
262. For other cases in this line of reasoning see Loffus v. Maw, 3 Giff. 592, 66 Eng.
Rep. 59 (V.C. 1862), Piggot v. Stratton, 1 De G.F. & J. 33, 45 Eng. Rep. 271 (Ch. 1859), and
Prole v. Soady, 2 Giff. 1, 66 Eng. Rep. 1 (V.C. 1859).
263. 4 H.L.C. 1039, 10 Eng. Rep. 769 (H.L. 1854).
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potential reach of Hammersley by rationalizing the outcome of
Hammersley in contractual terms. In Maunsell, Mr. Eyre, the
plaintiff's uncle, wrote the plaintiff, who was engaged to be mar-
ried, two letters in which he promised to leave some property to
the plaintiff upon his death.264 Mr. Eyre subsequently refused to
settle the property on the plaintiff and devised it to others.265 On
the plaintiffs action against the trustees of Mr. Eyre's will, it was
held that the plaintiff could not recover as he had no claim in con-
tract. Lord Cranworth, in his opinion, stated:
Where a man engages to do a particular thing, he must do it; that is
a contract; but where there are no direct words of contract, the ques-
tion must be, what has he done? He has made a contract, or he has
not; in the former case he must fulfill his contract; in the latter there
is nothing that he is bound to fulfill. A representation may be so
made as to constitute the ground of a contract. But is it so here?
Where a person makes a representation of what he says he has done,
or of some independent fact, and makes that representation under
circumstances which he must know will be laid before other persons
who are to act on the faith of his representation being true, and who
do act on it, equity will bind him by such representation, treating it
as a contract.
2 6
He added: "There is no middle term, no tertium quid between a
representation so made as to be effective for such a purpose and
being effective for it, and a contract: they are identical."267
Referring to Hammersley, Lord Cranworth then commented:
[Tihough you see the word "representation" used as it is in the
speech of ... Lord [Cottenham] ... I cannot think that it was meant
to bear the construction now attributed to it, and to raise any such
distinction as is now relied on. That word is no part of the judgment.
I must say that I do not think it is a word very happily employed.
The only distinction I understand is this, that some words which
would not amount to a contract in one transaction may possibly be
held to do so in another. 268
After so undermining the credibility of Hammersley as an au-
thority for the proposition that unbargained-for but reasonably
264. Id. at 1040-41, 10 Eng. Rep. at 770.
265. See id. at 1046-49, 10 Eng. Rep. at 772-73.
266. Id. at 1055, 10 Eng. Rep. at 755.
267. Id. at 1056, 10 Eng. Rep. at 776.
268. Id.
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and justifiably relied-on representations were actionable under
English law in Maunsell, Lord Cranworth severely limited the
emerging principle of actionable relied-on representations in Jor-
den v. Money.2"9
The House of Lords held in Jorden that to be enforceable the
representation forming the basis of the cause of action had to be
shown to be one of existing facts, not merely intentions.27 ° In Jor-
den, the House of Lords held that a bondholder could recover the
money due under the bond even though the bondholder had made
statements that she would not enforce the bond and had aban-
doned her claim under it though these statements had been acted
upon by the debtor and though the debtor had entered into obli-
gations with third parties in reliance upon the statements.271
Lord Chancellor Cranworth held that these statements merely
amounted to an expression of the bondholder's intentions and did
not amount to such a representation of existing facts; thus, the
doctrine of estoppel "does not apply to a case where the represen-
tation is not a representation of a fact, but a statement of some-
thing which the party intends or does not intend to do."272
As I previously stated, the House of Lords further limited the
utility of reliance-based estoppel in England in 1891 in the case of
Low v. Bouverie.2 ' In this case, the House of Lords categorically
ruled that estoppel is only a rule of evidence and cannot found an
action.274 The decision in Low that estoppel was not a cause of ac-
tion but could only prevent rights from being enforced when it
was inequitable to do so ensured that estoppel emerged from the
nineteenth century as a rather mild doctrine. It was now only a
defensive mechanism: a shield, never a sword.275 With the reli-
ance-based estoppel so consigned as a rule of evidence and a point
of pleading, the doctrine of consideration emerged as the sole test
of contractual obligations under English law.
One form of reliance-based estoppel, however, continued to
thrive in England throughout this period of decline. This is the
269. 5 H.L.C. 185, 10 Eng. Rep. 868 (H.L. 1854).
270. See supra Part VI.
271. See Jorden, 5 H.L.C. at 223-24, 10 Eng. Rep. at 885.
272. Id. at 214-15, 10 Eng. Rep. at 882.
273. [1891] 3 Ch. 82 (C.A.).
274. Id. at 105; see also supra note 191 and accompanying text.
275. See, e.g., Combe v. Combe, [1951] 2 K.B. 215, 219.
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proprietary estoppel. Notwithstanding the House of Lords's deci-
sions in Jorden and Low, courts continued to permit plaintiffs to
establish causes of action based on relied-on representations of
future intentions by the defendants where the underlying subject-
matter respecting the representations was land. This exceptional
doctrine of proprietary estoppel was, perhaps, developed as the
judicial acknowledgement of the importance of land in feudal
England. In every regard but the subject-matter, the doctrine was
essentially the reliance-based estoppel A la Hammersley. The
roots of the proprietary estoppel doctrine can be traced to early
English cases where courts prevented a defendant who had en-
couraged or acquiesced to the plaintiff to invest in property,
which the defendant-but not the plaintiff-knew belonged to the
defendant, from asserting her property rights against the plain-
tiff.276 The reasoning by the courts in these early cases was that
an owner of land who permits another person to invest in the
property, in effect, represents to that person that she would not
object to the rights asserted by that person.
Another early example of this line of cases is Huning v. Fer-
rers,277 which was decided in 1711. In this case, the plaintiff had a
twelve-year lease of some mills. 27 When the lease was about to
expire, the plaintiff approached the person he then thought had
the power to extend the lease for another thirty years and ar-
ranged for the extension.2 79 Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, this
other person was only a life tenant, and was not entitled to grant
the lease. 2 0 The defendant, however, who was entitled in the re-
mainder, knew the life tenant was prohibited from granting a
lease.2"' The defendant not only failed to warn the plaintiff but
encouraged him to expend the then huge sum of £2,800 in im-
provements on the property.2 2 When the life tenant died and the
defendant became entitled to the property, the defendant at-
tempted to evict the plaintiff from the property.2 3 The plaintiff
276. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Norton, 1 Vern. 137, 23 Eng. Rep. 370 (Ch. 1682); Hunt v.
Carew, Nels. 47, 21 Eng. Rep. 786 (Ch. 1649).
277. Gilb. Rep. 84, 25 Eng. Rep. 59 (Ch. 1711).
278. Id. at 85, 25 Eng. Rep. at 59.
279. See id.
280. See id., 25 Eng. Rep. at 59-60.
281. Id., 25 Eng. Rep. at 60.
282. Id., 25 Eng. Rep. at 59-60.
283. See id., 25 Eng. Rep. at 60.
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brought an action in Chancery to prevent the ejectment.284 It was
held that it would be fraudulent if the defendant were allowed to
insist on his strict legal rights to the detriment of the plaintiff
whom the defendant had encouraged to invest on the property.285
Similarly, in East India Company v. Vincent,286 the defendant,
an owner of land abutting the plaintiffs property, orally agreed
that the plaintiff could erect a certain building upon terms to
which the defendant acquiesced. 8 7 Subsequently, the defendant
built a wall to obstruct the lights in the new building. 28 The de-
fendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds in his defense.2" 9 Lord
Hardwicke, however, ordered the defendant to pull down the wall
obstructing light into the plaintiffs new building. 29 ° Lord Hard-
wicke reasoned that the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of
the agreement relating to the lights, and should be quieted in
their enjoyment.29'
These cases were cited and relied upon in a line of cases in the
nineteenth century, which shaped the doctrine of proprietary es-
toppel. The doctrine unmistakably developed as a cause of ac-
tion-at the same time that Low and its progeny had established
that other forms of reliance-based estoppels could not found a
cause of action.
The most well known of these cases is Dillwyn v. Llewelyn.292
In this case, a father "gave" land to his son, the plaintiff.293 No
formal conveyance was ever made, however, so the gift was not
perfected.29 4 Nonetheless, with the assent of the father, the son
proceeded to build a home on the land.295 On the death of the fa-
ther, the son sought a declaration that he was entitled to the land
in the face of a will granting the land to other members of the
284. Id.
285. See id.
286. 2 Atk. 83, 26 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch. 1740).
287. See id. at 83, 26 Eng. Rep. at 451.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. De G.F. & J. 517, 45 Eng. Rep. 1285 (Ch. 1862).
293. See id. at 520, 45 Eng. Rep. at 1286.
294. See id.
295. Id.
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family. 296 The court gave the son the right to call for a proper con-
veyance.297 Lord Chancellor Westbury held that while a voluntary
agreement to make a gift was not enforceable in equity for lack of
consideration, where the donee had, with the knowledge of the
promisor, expended money on the land, the donee acquired an in-
terest in the land because the donee had acquired a reasonable
expectation in the land.298
The emergence of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel as used
in Dillwyn as a self-standing doctrine with offensive capacity was
categorically enunciated by Lord Kingsdown in the famous case of
Ramsden v. Dyson.299 Though the principle failed on the facts of
the case, in a dictum, Lord Kingsdown laid down what is consid-
ered the first categorical enunciation of the doctrine in the follow-
ing paragraph:
If a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain in-
terest in land, or, what amounts to the same thing, under an expec-
tation, created or encouraged by the landlord, that he shall have a
certain interest, takes possession of such land, with the consent of
the landlord, and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with
the knowledge of the landlord, and without objection by him, lays out
296. See id.
297. See id. at 523, 45 Eng. Rep. at 1287.
298. See id. at 521-22, 45 Eng. Rep. at 1286-87. Lord Westbury was clear that it is the
subsequent detriment suffered by the plaintiff (after the promise had been given) which
entitled the plaintiff to the land-and expressly equated such detriment to consideration
in an enforceable contract. Hence Lord Westbury stated:
About the rules of the court there can be no controversy. A voluntary agree-
ment will not be completed or assisted by a Court of Equity, in cases of mere
gift. If anything be wanting to complete the title of the donee, a Court of Eq-
uity will not assist him in obtaining it; for a mere donee can have no right to
claim more than he has received. But the subsequent acts of the donor may
give the donee that right or ground of claim which he did not acquire from the
original gift. Thus, if A. gives a house to B., but makes no formal conveyance,
and the house is afterwards, on the marriage of B., included, with the knowl-
edge of A., in the marriage settlement of B., A. would be bound to complete
the title of the parties claiming under that settlement. So if A. puts B. in pos-
session of a piece of land, and tells him, "I give it to you that you may build a
house on it," and B. on the strength of that promise, with the knowledge of A.,
expends a large sum of money in building a house accordingly, I cannot doubt
that the donee acquires a right from the subsequent transaction to call on the
donor to perform that contract and complete the imperfect donation which
was made .... The equity of the donee and the estate to be claimed by virtue
of it depend on the transaction, that is, on the acts done, and not on the lan-
guage of the memorandum [which amounted to an imperfect gift].
Id.
299. [1866] 1 L.R.E. & I. App. 129 (H.L.).
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money upon the land, a Court of equity will compel the landlord to
give effect to such promise or expectation.
30 0
Hence, in England, the doctrine of proprietary estoppel sur-
vived the period in the nineteenth century when consideration
was expanded and other reliance-based estoppels were limited.
As aforesaid, this may be explained by the importance of land in
feudal England. Suffice it to say that plaintiffs could bring an ac-
tion based on proprietary estoppel where the plaintiff had relied
on an expectation created by the owner of land to the plaintiffs
detriment. In the United Kingdom, this cause of action has sur-
vived to the modern times and is frequently invoked by plaintiffs
who cannot otherwise base their claims on contract because of a
lack of consideration.30'
Aside from this doctrine of proprietary estoppel, in the late
nineteenth century, the growth of commerce and the need for
more certainty and flexibility in business necessitated a judicial
revision of the restriction of the reliance-based estoppel. This re-
laxation came slowly and haltingly in the two cases of Hughes v.
Metropolitan Railway Co.3 2 and Birmingham & District Land
Co. v. London & North Western Railway Co.,30 3 decided in 1877
and 1888 respectively.
300. Id. at 170.
301. Modern (famous) examples of this doctrine in action in England include Gissing v.
Gissing, [1971] A.C. 886 (H.L. 1970); Taylors Fashions Ltd. v. Liverpool Victoria Trustees
Co., [19821 1 Q.B. 133 (Ch. 1979); Crabb v. Arun District Council, [1976] 1 Ch. 179 (C.A.
1975); and Inwards v. Baker, [1965 Ch.] 2 Q.B. 29 (C.A.). The leading modern authority is
Crabb. In this case, the English Court of Appeal upheld a plaintiffs claim that he was en-
titled to a right of access to the defendant's land and a right of way along a road after he
had been led to believe that he would be granted such a right of access, and had been en-
couraged to act to his detriment in selling part of his own land without any reservation
over it of a right of way. Crabb, [1976] 1 Ch. at 189-90. Lord Justice Scarman stated the
law thus:
The rule of law applicable to the case appears to me to be this: If a man, un-
der a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land, or, what
amounts to the same thing, under an expectation, created or encouraged by
the landlord"-my italics-"that he shall have a certain interest, takes pos-
session of such land, with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of
such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord, and without
objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a court of equity will compel
the landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation.
Id. at 193 (quoting Ramsden v. Dyson [1866] 1 L.R.E. & I. App. 129, 170 (H.L.)).
302. [18771 2 A.C. 439 (H.L.).
303. 40 Ch. D. 268 (C.A. 1888).
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In Hughes, a landlord gave his tenant notice requiring him to
do repairs within six months." 4 During that period the tenant
began negotiations with the landlord for the purchase, by the
landlord, of the remainder of the lease.3 °5 During this period of
negotiations, the tenant did not do the repairs as demanded by
the landlord." 6 When the negotiations for the purchase of the
lease eventually broke down, the landlord tried to rely on his six
month notice to eject the tenant for noncompliance.0 7 It was held
that, by entering into negotiations for the purchase of the lease,
the landlord had led the tenant to believe that he would not en-
force his notice without giving the tenant reasonable time to do
the repairs."' Lord Chancellor Cairns, giving the leading speech,
made the following statement in what is now considered by many
to be the genesis of "promissory" or "equitable" estoppel in the
United Kingdom:30 9
It was not argued at your Lordships' Bar, and it could not be argued,
that there was any right of a Court of Equity, or any practice of a
Court of Equity, to give relief in cases of this kind, by way of mercy,
or by way merely of saving property from forfeiture, but it is the first
principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed, that if parties who
have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal
results-certain penalties or legal forfeiture-afterwards by their
own act or with their own consent enter upon a course of negotiation
which has the effect of leading one of the parties to suppose that the
strict rights arising under the contract will not be enforced, or will be
kept in suspense, or held in abeyance, the person who otherwise
might have enforced those rights will not be allowed to enforce them
where it would be inequitable having regard to the dealings which
have thus taken place between the parties.
3 10
Eleven years later, in Birmingham and District Land Co., the
Court of Appeal endorsed and extended the doctrine of "equitable
304. [1877] 2 A.C. at 440.
305. See id. at 440-41.
306. See id.
307. Id. at 441.
308. See id. at 447, 449-50, 452-53.
309. See, e.g., Susan M. Morgan, A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrine of Promissory
Estoppel in Australia, Great Britain and the United States, 15 MELB. U. L. REV. 134, 136
(1985) ("It is generally agreed that promissory estoppel in Britain had its genesis in a
statement by Lord Cairns in Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway."). As this part has argued,
the true roots of promissory estoppel in England go much deeper than the latter half of the
nineteenth century.
310. Hughes, [1877] 2 A.C. at 448.
[Vol. 41:425
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
estoppel" enunciated (but not so called) in Hughes."' Again, the
parties here were in negotiations and it was contended by the
plaintiff that the ongoing negotiations precluded the defendant
from a strict insistence on its legal rights.312 The defendant
sought to limit the principle announced in Hughes to cases of eq-
uitable relief against forfeiture."3 The Court of Appeal dis-
agreed." 4 Lord Justice Lindley quoted from the above-cited
speech by Lord Cairns in Hughes and stated "that [the principle
as stated by Lord Cairns] is the general principle and I think that
it is plainly applicable here" even though the case did not involve
a forfeiture." 5 Similarly, Lord Justice Bowen refused to limit the
principle enunciated in Hughes to cases of forfeiture, and fa-
mously said:
Now it was suggested by Mr. Clare that that proposition [contained
in Lord Cairns speech in Hughes] only applied to cases where penal
rights in the nature of forfeiture, or analogous to those of forfeiture,
were sought to be enforced. I entirely fail to see any such possible
distinction. The principle has nothing to do with forfeiture .... The
truth is that the proposition is wider than cases of forfeiture. It
seems to me to amount to this, that if persons who have contractual
rights against others induce by their conduct those against whom
they have such rights to believe that such rights will either not be
enforced or will be kept in suspense or abeyance for some particular
time, those persons will not be allowed by a Court of Equity to en-
force the rights until such time has elapsed, without at all events
placing the parties in the same position as they were before.
316
It should be clear that what is in operation here is a form of the
doctrine that the American lawyer would easily identify as "prom-
issory estoppel." It should again be clear that this doctrine closely
resembles the reliance-based estoppel enunciated by Lord Coten-
ham in Hammersley."7 It should be noted, however, that as the
doctrine re-emerges in England in the second half of the nine-
teenth century in Hughes and Birmingham & District Land Co.,
it has been significantly emasculated. To overcome the strictures
placed on reliance-based estoppel by Jorden and Low, the "new"
311. [1888] 40 Ch. D. 268 (1888).
312. See id. at 270.
313. See id. at 272.
314. See id. at 279.
315. See id. at 281.
316. Id. at 286.
317. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
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doctrine developed in Hughes and applied in Birmingham & Dis-
trict Land Co. was limited to persons who already had contrac-
tual relations, or at least "definite and distinct" legal relations.31
If such persons induced the other party to a contract to believe
that they would not strictly enforce their contractual rights, the
courts would not allow them to go back on their word-even if the
modification of the contractual rights had not been supported by
consideration. In essence, the Hughes doctrine returned the state
of the law to the pre-Jorden and pre-Low state-as far as parties
in contractual relations were concerned. Of course, if the parties
had no contractual relations prior to the representations, the
Hughes doctrine would not come to their aid-unless, of course,
they could rely on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this short his-
tory of reliance-based estoppel in England. The first point to note
is that though reliance-based estoppel first emerged as a general-
ized estoppel with offensive capacity, it was soon blunted by the
emerging force of contract law's doctrine of consideration. One,
Jorden held that for an estoppel to arise, there had to be a repre-
sentation of fact, as opposed to a representation of future inten-
tion.319 Two, Low held that an estoppel does not create a cause of
action but is merely a rule of evidence. 320 Nonetheless, the "new"
doctrine in Hughes somewhat revitalized this reliance-based es-
toppel.32" ' Under Hughes, parties who were already in a contrac-
tual relationship could, at least, set up an estoppel to prevent the
other party from going back on their word, and thereby succeed
on a cause of action based on the existing contract.322
The second point to note is that even though by the end of the
nineteenth century the general reliance-based estoppel had un-
dergone these limitations, one form of reliance-based estoppel-
the proprietary estoppel-was still available to plaintiffs, and
could found a cause of action in appropriate cases. The net effect
of these developments was that during the period when the Re-
staters were writing the First Restatement in the United States,
English law had already found two related, but distinct, doctrines
318. Denning, supra note 111, at 4.
319. See supra notes 189, 219-20 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 304-08 and accompanying text.
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to alleviate the problems caused by the rigidity of the doctrine of
consideration. These are the Hughes doctrine and the doctrine of
proprietary estoppel. The basic principle espoused in these two
doctrines is the same one espoused in the doctrine of promissory
estoppel as it developed in the United States.
If Williston and the other Restaters had taken into account
these developments, the need for a brand new doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel would have seemed less dire than it appeared to
them in 1932. The point in all this is to state that English law
had mitigated some of the excesses caused by the rigidity of the
doctrine of consideration even before 1932. As Lord Denning
would later say, referring to the inroads made by Hughes and
Birmingham & District Land Co.:
But strict legal rights are always capable of being modified by the in-
terposition of equity;... The courts have repeatedly invoked equita-
ble principles so as to neutralise ill effects of the common law doc-
trine of consideration. They have not done so in the formation of
contract, because there was no necessity there for the intervention of
equity. They have only done so in the modification or discharge of
contracts.
B. "Promissory Estoppel" Under English Law After 1932
Despite its promise, for decades, the Hughes doctrine was sel-
dom used in England.324 This remained true until 1946 when Jus-
tice Denning (as he then was) "re-discovered" it in the celebrated
case of Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House
323. Denning, supra note 111 at 4 (internal citations omitted) (referring to Hughes and
Birmingham & District Land Co.).
324. Some cases arguably applied the Hughes doctrine in the years ensuing the Hughes
decision. See, e.g., Buttery v. Pickard [1946] 1 W.N. 25 (K.B.); Salisbury (Marquess) v. Gil-
more [1942] 2 K.B. 38 (C.A.); In re William Porter & Co. Ltd. [19371 2 All. E.R. 361 (K.B.);
In re Wickham [1917] 34 T.L.R. 158 (K.B.); and Fenner v. Blake [19001 1 Q.B. 426. Justice
Denning cites all these cases in his decision in the celebrated case of Central London Prop-
erty Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947] K.B. 130 (the High Trees Case) which is
analyzed in detail below. Of all these cases, however, the only one that made a reference to
Hughes was Salisbury (Marquess) v. Gilmore. See Gilmore [1942] 2 K.B. at 43-44. Not
surprisingly, Mr. AT. Denning (who later became Justice Denning) appeared for one of
the parties in the Court of Appeal, and specifically urged the court to rule for his client on
the basis of the "equitable principle" laid down in Birmingham and District Land Co. See
id. at 41-44. For an exhaustive analysis of all these cases relied on by Justice Denning in
reaching his decision in the landmark High Trees Case, see Alexander K. Turner, "High
Trees House"Re-Inspected-Promissory Estoppel in 1963 1 N.Z.U. L. REV. 185 (1964).
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Ltd.3 25 (the "High Trees Case"). In the case, the plaintiff, a lessor
of a block of flats for a term of ninety-nine years, represented to
the defendant, the lessee, that the lessee could pay reduced rent
due to the war conditions, and the consequent absence of people
from London during the Second World War.3 26 The defendant
paid the reduced rent for four years.3 27 By the fourth year, all the
flats in the block were fully let and the lessor demanded for pay-
ment of rent in full-including the arrears for the period when
the lessee had paid reduced rent.328 The lessor instituted proceed-
ings seeking a declaration that the rent payable was that which
was stated in the lease agreement on the ground that the subse-
quent arrangement for reduced rent was not supported by consid-
eration. 329 Faced with Foakes v. Beer (holding that part-
performance is not sufficient consideration) on the one hand, and
Jorden (holding that to give rise to an estoppel a representation
must be one as to existing facts) on the other, Justice Denning re-
sorted to the Hughes doctrine in holding that the lessor could not
recover the arrears that had accrued. Justice Denning reasoned:
The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money. There has
been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although
they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are
cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create le-
gal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the
promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was
made, and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts
have said the promise must be honored .... The courts have not
gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for the breach of
such a promise, but they have refused to allow the party making it to
act inconsistently with it.
330
After approvingly citing Hughes and Birmingham & District
Land Co. Justice Denning added that "the time has now come for
325. [1947] K-B. 130 (1946).
326. Id. at 131.
327. See id.
328. Id.
329. See id. at 131-32. See also Foakes v. Beer 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884); Pinnel's
Case 5 Co. Rep. 117a, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (C.P. 1602). The contractual rule established by
these two cases is the familiar one called the "pre-existing duty rule." Under this rule, an
agreement modifying an existing contract is not supported by consideration if one of the
parties merely promises to do what they were already legally obligated to do under the
contract.
330. [1947] KB. at 134 (internal citations omitted).
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the validity of such a promise [i.e., one intended to induce action,
and which does, in fact, induce such action] to be recognized."33'
With these words, Justice Denning revitalized what came to be
known as "equitable estoppel" or "quasi-estoppel" under English
law.332 Justice Denning was careful to point out that this "equita-
ble principle," as he called it as counsel in Salisbury (Marquess) v.
Gilmore, could not found a cause of action; it could only discharge
or reduce prior obligations.333 In this way, even while resurrecting
reliance-based estoppel from the graveyard of obscurity and des-
uetude to which Jorden and Low had consigned it, Justice
Denning would not go as far as the First Restatement had done in
liberalizing the "equitable principle" he had spoken of so fondly.
Since Justice Denning gave his judgment in the High Trees
Case in 1947, at least fifteen years after the First Restatement
was adopted, we can only assume that he knew about the Ameri-
can development. Why does he then fall short of liberalizing the
principle sufficiently to permit it to found a cause of action? It has
been suggested by some commentators that this was Denning's
ultimate goal or wish but that he felt hamstrung by the authori-
ties. 3 4 This theory, however, is somewhat impugned by Denning's
own judgment in Combe v. Combe.335
In Combe, the husband promised, during divorce proceedings,
to pay the wife an annual amount for maintenance.336 Following
this promise, the wife did not apply for an official order for main-
tenance. 337 The husband, however, had not specifically asked the
wife not to apply for such an order.338 Subsequently, the husband
failed to pay the annual amount as promised, and the wife
sued. 39 Since there was no consideration for the husband's prom-
ise, the wife could not succeed on an action for a breach of con-
331. Id. at 135.
332. See Ajayi v. Briscoe [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1326, 1330 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Nig.);
LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 205 (1979); L.A. Sheridan, Equitable Estoppel
Today, 15 MOD. L. REV. 325 (1952).
333. [1947] K.B. at 135.
334. See, e.g., Cooke, supra note 72, at 35-36.
335. [1951] 2 K.B. 215 (C.A.).
336. Id. at 216.
337. Id.
338. See id.
339. Id. at 216-17.
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tract.34 Instead, the wife relied on the "equitable principle" estab-
lished in the High Trees Case as a basis for her claim. She ar-
gued, on the basis of the High Trees Case, that the husband had
made a promise, she had acted on it (by not seeking a mainte-
nance order from the courts), and that the action had been to her
detriment.
41
In the first instance, Judge Byrne, the trial judge, accepted the
wife's argument and held that the husband's promise was "en-
forceable on the principle stated in Central London Property
Trust Ld. v. High Trees House Ld."'342 On appeal, Justice Denning
nipped in the bud any hopes that the High Trees Case principle
would be extended to match the developments wrought by section
90 of the First Restatement in the United States. Justice Denning
emphatically stated:
Much as I am inclined to favor the principle stated in the High Trees
case, it is important that it should not be stretched too far, lest it
should be endangered. That principle does not create new causes of
action where none existed before. It only prevents a party from in-
sisting upon his strict legal rights, when it would be unjust to allow
him to enforce them, having regard to the dealings which have taken
place between the parties.
Justice Denning then adds:
Seeing that the principle never stands alone as giving a cause of ac-
tion in itself, it can never do away with the necessity of consideration
when that is an essential part of the cause of action. The doctrine of
consideration is too firmly fixed to be overthrown by a side-wind. Its
ill-effects have been largely mitigated of late, but it still remains a
cardinal necessity of the formation of a contract, though not of its
modification or discharge. I fear that it was my failure to make this
clear [in the High Trees Case] which misled Byrne, J., in the present
case. He held that the wife could sue on the husband's promise as a
separate and independent cause of action by itself, although, as he
held, there was no consideration for it. That is not correct. The wife
can only enforce it if there was consideration for it.
344
340. Id. at 220-21.
341. Id. at 218.
342. Id. at 217.
343. Id. at 219 (internal citations omitted).
344. Id. at 220-21.
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In this paragraph, Justice Denning indicated why he did not
believe it was necessary to use the High Trees Case principle to
supplement the doctrine of consideration in contract formation
under English law: the doctrine of consideration had already, in
his view, been modified sufficiently. It was not necessary to use
the estoppel he developed in the High Trees Case to assist plain-
tiffs who had relied on representations by parties with whom they
did not yet have contractual relations. As Justice Denning would
later write in a law review, he believed that there was "no neces-
sity" for equity to intervene to tamper the doctrine of considera-
tion during the formation of contracts.345 In turn, the reason he
thought there was no necessity for equity to intervene during the
formation of contracts was because his definition of consideration
was sufficiently broader than the bargained-for definition which
prevails in the United States. Hence, Justice Denning argued:
The law for centuries has been that an act done at the request of an-
other, express or implied, is sufficient consideration to support a
promise.... The only essentials are the promise by the one and the
forbearance by the other on the faith of it. Even though there was no
request in fact for the forbearance, nevertheless if the promise was
given with the intention of inducing the creditor to forbear on the
faith of it, the law will imply a request .... In these circumstances it
may be well that, instead of using the old language of "request" and
"consideration" we can express the self-same principle by saying that
a promise is binding in law if it was intended to create legal rela-
tions, intended to be acted u4on and was in fact acted upon by the
person to whom it was given.
The way Justice Denning defines consideration is noteworthy
because it harkens back to the notion of "invented consideration"
as discussed by treatise-writer Guenter Treitel.347 If the law is
willing to "imply" a request, it follows that a majority of the cases
covered by the American doctrine of promissory estoppel would
immediately be transformed to "consideration" under this defini-
tion. This would, in turn, make the doctrine of promissory estop-
pel superfluous if offered to enforce relied-on promises-simply
because the law would imply a request by the promisor to the
promisee to do the actions or forbearance which would be the ba-
sis of the estoppel action hence transforming such actions or for-
345. Denning, supra note 111, at 4.
346. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
347. See supra note 106-07 and accompanying text.
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bearance into consideration. Hence, Justice Denning said of con-
sideration in Bob Guiness Ltd. v. Salomonsen:34s "It must be re-
membered that that which amounts, in legal theory, to considera-
tion, is sometimes a real consideration and sometimes not.
Consideration in law is sometimes the real purchase price of a
promise, and sometimes it is a mere fiction devised to make a
promise enforceable."349
C. "Promissory Estoppel" Under English Law Today
As a doctrinal matter, the position reached by Justice Denning
in Combe still has the force of law under English law today.35 ° In
Ajayi v. R.T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd.,35' the Privy Council drew the
contours of the doctrine of promissory estoppel under English
law:
Their Lordships are of [sic] opinion that the principle of law as de-
fined by Bowen L.J. has been confirmed by the House of Lords in the
case of Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Tungsten Electric Co.
Ltd. where the authorities were reviewed and no encouragement was
given to the view that the principle was capable of extension so as to
create rights in the promisee for which he had given no considera-
tion. The principle, which has been described as quasi estoppel and
perhaps more aptly as promissory estoppel, is that when one party to
a contract in the absence of fresh consideration agrees not to enforce
his rights an equity will be raised in favor of the other party. This
equity is, however, subject to the qualifications (1) that the other
party has altered his position, (2) that the promisor can resile from
his promise on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal
notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his
position, (3) the promise only becomes final and irrevocable if the
promisee cannot resume his position.
352
348. [19481 2 K.B. 42.
349. Id. at 45.
350. See, e.g., Petromec Inc. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. Petrobras, [2004] EWHC 127,
[155]-[166] (Comm); Tesco Stores Ltd. v. Costain Constr. Ltd., [2003] EWHC 1487, [193]-
[951 (TCC); Baird Textiles Holdings Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer Plc. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 274,
[341, [87]; Azov Shipping Co. v. Baltic Shipping Co., [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 159, 160.
351. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1326 (P.C.).
352. Id. at 1330 (internal citation omitted).
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This has been generally accepted as the correct statement of
the law on promissory estoppel in England. 353 As it currently ex-
ists, the doctrine has five elements:354
(1) There must be a clear and unequivocal promise or represen-
tation by the person against whom the estoppel is being raised;
355
(2) The promisee must have acted on the promise or represen-
tation to her "detriment;"356
(3) It must be unconscionable for the promisor to act inconsis-
tently with her representation;
357
(4) The effect of the doctrine is to suspend rather than extin-
guish rights: the party who made the representation is not es-
topped forever; she can, where possible, resume her legal rights
upon giving reasonable notice;38 and
(5) The doctrine prevents the enforcement of existing rights in
the face of concessions by the rights-holder, but does not create
new rights.359
There is on-going debate over whether the doctrine can be used
where the parties do not have contractual relations. Some courts
have latched onto Justice Denning's decision in Combe, which re-
353. See, e.g., Crabb v. Arun Dist. Council, [1976] 1 Ch. 179 (C.A. 1975); White v. Van-
dervell Trustees Ltd., [1974] Ch. 269; D. & C. Builders Ltd. v. Rees, [1966] 2 Q.B. 617
(C.A.); Roger Halson, The Offensive Limits of Promissory Estoppel, 1999, L.M.C.L.Q. 256;
Morgan, supra note 309.
354. Halson, supra note 353, at 257-58.
355. See, e.g., Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries S.A. v. Shipping Corp. of India,
[1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391, 399 (H.L. 1989); Allied Marine Transp. Ltd. v. Vale Do Rio Doce
Navegaqao S.A., (1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 18, 25, 28 (C.A.).
356. See, e.g., Goldsworthy v. Brickell, [1987] Ch. 378, 411 (C.A.). There is considerable
controversy over whether there must be "detriment" in the sense that the person to whom
the representation was made is left worse off financially or otherwise, or whether it is suf-
ficient that the promisee was influenced by or relied on the representation. Some courts
have indicated all that is required is some positive acts of reliance. Compare Ajayi, [1964]
1 W.L.R. at 1330, with Tool Metal Mfg. Co. v. Tungsten Elec. Co., [1955] 1 W.L.R. 761,
783-84 (Tucker, J. concurring).
357. See, e.g., Jennings v. Rice [2002] EWCA (Civ) 159, [2]-[3]; D. & C. Builders v.
Rees, [1966] 2 Q.B. 617, 625 (C.A.).
358. See, e.g., National Westminster Bank Plc v. Somer, Int'l (U.K.) Ltd., [2001] EWCA
(Civ) 970, [35], [2002] 3 W.L.R. 64, 79 ("This [estoppel by representation] differs from the
position in the case of so-called 'equitable' or 'promissory estoppel' in respect of which a
specific promise to waive or refrain from enforcing rights may be withdrawn on reasonable
notice.").
359. See, e.g., Combe v. Combe, [1951] 2 K.B. 215, 220 (C.A.); Petromec, [2004] EWHC
at [163]. But see D. Jackson, Estoppel as a Sword (pt. 2), 81 L.Q.R. 84, 223 (1965) (arguing
that English authorities permit the direct enforcement of a relied-on representation or
promise).
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fers to parties' "legal relations" 360 to rule that any pre-existing re-
lationship, even if not contractual, would suffice to entitle a party
to the aid of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 361 Of course, us-
ing the doctrine outside the contractual setting opens it up for ex-
tension, but that extension has not reached a stage where courts
are willing to found a cause of action on a "naked" promissory es-
toppel.362
As we will see shortly, however, English courts are reaching a
similar result, not by explicitly overruling the limitation in
Combe, but by arguing for recognition of a "unified" estoppel
which does not distinguish between promissory or proprietary es-
toppel. The result of such unification would be to make all justi-
fiably relied-on representations enforceable; in other words, to
bring English law in line with the American developments on the
doctrine as espoused in section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts ("Second Restatement"). 63 Curiously, the inspiration for
this "unification" seems to come not directly from the United
States, where the doctrine of promissory estoppel functionally
achieved such unification, but from the Commonwealth countries
that have adopted the American formulation of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, such as Australia.3 64 If this trend continues
and becomes established English law, promissory estoppel will
complete an intriguing journey as a legal transplant: from Eng-
land to the United States; and back to England through the
Commonwealth. In any event, that would be a remarkable suc-
cess rate for a legal transplant.
This begs the question: what about the character of promissory
estoppel as a doctrine makes it such a successful legal trans-
plant? I very briefly and tentatively suggest an answer to this
question in the conclusion. Before then, I briefly catalog "evi-
dence" of the "reverse influence" of the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel on English law.
360. Combe, [1951] 2 K.B. at 220.
361. See, e.g., Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. v. Michael Jackson (Fancy Goods) Ltd., [1968]
2 Q.B. 839-47.
362. Halson, supra note 353, at 258.
363. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
364. See, e.g., Derby v. Scottish Equitable Plc. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 369; see also Guenter
Treitel, Some Comparative Notes on English and American Contract Law, 55 SMU L. REV.
357, 357 (2002).
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X. THE REVERSE INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN PROMISSORY
ESTOPPEL ON ENGLISH LAW
If one begins with the categorical statement of the law enunci-
ated by the Privy Council in Ajayi v. R.T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd.,
one might conclude that the American developments of the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel have had little effect in influencing
English law. This doctrinal position, however, masks some nu-
anced changes to the English doctrine of promissory estoppel as it
developed, or at least to the legal discourse about it.
In the first place, the courts have gradually accepted that the
doctrine can be used outside the contractual context. This makes
the doctrine available in a great variety of fact patterns involving
relied-on representations which might have been otherwise unen-
forceable. The result is to bring the English doctrine closer to the
American doctrine. A good example is provided by the case of
Evenden v. Guildford City Assoc. Football Club, Ltd. 65 In this
case, the plaintiff was employed by one entity, the Supporters
Club.3 6 He was then transferred to a separate, independent but
related entity, the Football Club,367 and was promised that he
would not suffer any detriment following his transfer.36 The
question was whether this promise entitled him to layoff pay for
the whole period of time he was under the employ of both related
entities.369 But for that promise, he would only be entitled to re-
dundancy pay for the period of time he was employed by the
Football Club.37° The plaintiff sought to rely on promissory estop-
pel to prove his case, but the defendant raised the objection that
there was no pre-existing contractual relationship when the
promise was made.371 Lord Denning affirmed that promissory es-
toppel is not limited to cases where parties are already bound
contractually one to the other, but that "[i]t applies whenever a
representation is made, whether of fact or law, present or future,
which is intended to be binding, intended to induce a person to
365. [1975] 1 Q.B. 917 (C.A.).
366. Id. at 922.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 923.
369. Id. at 922.
370. Id. at 923.
371. Id. at 920-21.
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act upon it and he does act upon it."372 These are exactly the sorts
of scenarios where the American doctrine of promissory estoppel
is used.
Secondly, the American concept has influenced English courts
in latter years to openly flirt with the idea of "unifying" estoppel
with the result that relied-on representations would be directly
enforced even outside a contractual setting.373 This process began
in earnest in Crabb v. Arun.374 It was, again, Lord Denning who
led the way in this regard. In Crabb, the plaintiff sold part of his
land without reserving a right of way for the retained part be-
cause he had been led to believe by a representative of the defen-
dant district council that they would allow him to construct and
use an alternative access over their land. 375 After the plaintiff
constructed and used the alternative access, and the district
council then tried to prevent him from continuing to use the
road.376 The main objection to the plaintiffs claim was that there
was no definite representation, and therefore no claim of promis-
sory estoppel could be sustained. Further, the plaintiff was not
mistaken about his property rights, and therefore no claim under
proprietary estoppel could lie.377 In granting relief to the plaintiff,
Lord Denning refused to pigeon-hole the claim into either promis-
sory estoppel-which could not found a cause of action-or pro-
prietary estoppel, which could. Instead, he only spoke of an "eq-
uity":
[If a person] by his words or conduct, so behaves as to lead another to
believe that he will not insist on his strict legal rights-knowing or
intending that the other will act on that belief-and he does so act,
that again will raise an equity in favour of the other; and it is for a
court of equity to say in what way the equity may be satisfied. 
378
In the same case, Lord Scarman deprecated the distinction be-
tween proprietary and promissory estoppel:
372. Id. at 924.
373. See, e.g., Derby v. Scottish Equitable Plc. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 369.
374. [1976] Ch. 179 (C.A.).
375. Id. at 184.
376. Id. at 186-87.
377. Id. at 182.
378. Id. at 188.
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I do not find helpful the distinction between promissory and proprie-
tary estoppel. This distinction may indeed be valuable to those who
teach or expound the law; but I do not think that, in solving the par-
ticular problem raised by a particular case, putting the law into
categories is of the slightest assistance. 
3 79
Instead, like Lord Denning, Lord Scarman spoke generally of
an "equity" that intervenes to aid the plaintiff where "it would be
unconscionable and unjust to allow the defendants to set up their
undoubted rights against the claim being made by the plain-
tiff."3 ° In his view, the proper analysis is for the court to "answer
three questions. First, is there an equity established? Secondly,
what is the extent of the equity, if one is established? And,
thirdly, what is the relief appropriate to satisfy the equity?"
38
'
The next important case to openly call for the fusion of the dif-
ferent estoppels is Taylors Fashions Ltd. v. Liverpool Victoria
Trustees Co. 382 Justice Oliver meticulously reviewed the relevant
authorities and announced:
[The] more recent cases indicate, in my judgment, that the applica-
tion of the Ramsden v. Dyson principle-whether you call it proprie-
tary estoppel, estoppel by acquiescence or estoppel by encouragement
is really immaterial-requires a very much broader approach which
is directed rather at ascertaining whether, in particular individual
circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permit-
ted to deny that which, knowingly, or unknowingly, he has allowed
or encouraged another to assume to his detriment than to inquiring
whether the circumstances can be fitted within the confines of some
preconceived formula serving as a universal yardstick for every form
of unconscionable behavior.
38 3
Finally, Lord Denning could not have been more direct in
Amalgamated Investment & Property Co. v. Texas Commerce In-
ternational Bank Ltd.3 4 Harping on the theme of flexibility and
prevention of unconscionable conduct, Lord Denning stated:
The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the
armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with cases.... It
379. Id. at 193.
380. Id. at 195.
381. Id. at 193.
382. [1982] Q.B. 133.
383. Id. at 151 (internal footnotes omitted).
384. [1982] Q.B. 84 (C.A.).
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has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate de-
velopments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact,
estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time
it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is
only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action,
estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so
forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle
shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on
the basis of an underlying assumption-either of fact or of law-
whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference-
on which they have conducted the dealings between them-neither
of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would
be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. 385
This evolution of promissory estoppel under English law-from
the resurrection of the limited Hughes doctrine by Lord Denning
to the more recent proposals to "unify" estoppel as a single princi-
ple of equity-parallels the evolution of American estoppel. Pro-
fessor Eric Holmes has described the four stages in the evolution
of the American concept of promissory estoppel.35 6 In the first
stage, the "estoppel phase," promissory estoppel is barely emerg-
ing from, and hardly distinguishable from, the doctrine of equita-
ble estoppel. s7 In this stage, the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
Professor Holmes argues, serves a defensive function-much like
estoppel generally does.3"' In this stage, courts permit promisees
to employ the doctrine of promissory estoppel to prevent promi-
sors from setting up technical legal rules such as the Statute of
Frauds, the statute of limitations, and the parol evidence rule as
defenses to contract enforcement.8 9 In the second stage, which
Professor Holmes calls the "contract phase," the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel has evolved sufficiently to serve as a substitute for
consideration. 390 This was the stage in which the doctrine found
itself during the drafting of the First Restatement.391
In the third stage, the "tort phase," courts employ the doctrine
of promissory estoppel offensively as an independent ground for
recovery and not merely as a substitute for consideration in a con-
385. Id. at 122.
386. See Holmes, Four Phases, supra note 9.
387. Id. at 56-64.
388. Id. at 56.
389. Id. at 57-58.
390. Id. at 65.
391. See id.
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tract action.39 2 In this phase, courts enforce promises seriously
made and reasonably relied on independent of a contract.393 Fi-
nally, in the fourth stage, the "equity phase," courts "have assimi-
lated the first three phases (estoppel, contract, and tort) and have
applied promissory estoppel equitably to rectify wrongs by award-
ing relief based on the discrete facts of each case." 394 "The remedy
... is discretionary. No... mechanical [bright line] rule applies.
[.. I]t is equitably molded. . for each case.... In this fourth
stage, courts are no longer concerned with questions of whether
the cause of action is sounding in contract, tort or equity; they are
concerned about applying the "four Chancery principles" of "good
faith, conscience, honesty and equity" to do justice by the parties
in specific cases.396 As Professor Knapp captures Professor
Holmes's fourth stage, promissory estoppel in this phase is "a
kind of meta-law, a super-hero with a roving commission to do
justice wherever justice cries out to be done."397
If this account of the evolution of promissory estoppel by Pro-
fessor Holmes is correct, it means that the American doctrine has
not only unshackled itself from its original status as a "shield,"
but has now grown out of the stage of only serving as a basis for a
cause of action in contract and tort. Now American courts are at a
point where they are primarily employing the concept as an un-
abridged "equity" aimed at protecting the right of a promisee to
rely without regard to whether the suit sounds in tort, contract,
equity, or property law. 39" This is precisely where Lord Denning
wants the English estoppel to be, as stated in Amalgamated In-
vestment & Property Co.
Lord Denning has received support for this position from both
judges and legal scholars. English courts, however, have not yet
accepted this "unified" estoppel as the law. 399 As one commentator
392. Id. at 67-68.
393. See id.
394. Id. at 51.
395. Id. at 75.
396. Id. at 73.
397. Knapp, supra note 16, at 1250.
398. Holmes, Four Phases, supra note 9, at 77-78.
399. The legal position under English law is still that expressed by Lord Justice Millet
in First National Bank PLC. v. Thompson [1996] Ch. 231 (C.A.):
[An] attempt to demonstrate that all estoppels other than estoppel by record
are now subsumed in the single and all-embracing estoppel by representation
and that they are all governed by the same requirements has never won gen-
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has stated, "The tendency of the English courts is still to com-
partmentalise the doctrine and has resulted in decisions which,
while justified under one type of estoppel, could equally have
fallen to be decided under another."4°0 Curiously, though, both the
judges who have supported the idea of a "unified" estoppel from
the bench and leading legal commentators who have supported
the idea in their writings find their inspiration from a line of Aus-
tralian cases on promissory estoppel decided in the last two dec-
ades of the twentieth century. 41 The first and most well known of
these cases is Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher.4 2 In this
case, Chief Justice Mason and Justice Wilson suggested that the
reason courts intervene in equitable estoppel cases is to prevent
"unconscionable conduct," and, therefore, the court would inter-
vene even if that entails the enforcement of voluntary prom-
ises.40 3 Hence, Chief Justice Mason and Justice Wilson reached
the remarkably radical position that under Australian law, repre-
sentations not supported by consideration could found a cause of
action, by re-defining estoppel singularly in terms of the need to
prevent unconscionable conduct. 44 They both copiously cite Jus-
tice Oliver in Taylors Fashions Ltd. and Lord Denning in Amal-
gamated Investment & Property Co.
There is no doubt, however, as to where Chief Justice Mason
and Justice Wilson drew most of their inspiration: section 90 of
eral acceptance. Historically unsound, it has been repudiated by academic
writers and is unsupported by authority.
Id. at 236; see also Republic of India v. India S.S. Co., [1998] A.C. 878, 914 (H.L.) (Steyn,
L.).
400. Mark Lunney, Towards a Unified Estoppel-The Long and Winding Road, 1992
CONV. & PROP. LAw. (N.S.) 239, 250 (citation omitted).
401. See infra notes 401-08 and accompanying text.
402. (1988) 164 C.L.R. 387.
403. Id. at [32], [34].
404. The Justices observe that:
Because equitable estoppel has its basis in unconscionable conduct, rather
than the making good of representations, the objection, grounded in Maddi-
son v. Alderson, that promissory estoppel outflanks the doctrine of part per-
formance loses much of its sting. Equitable estoppel is not a doctrine associ-
ated with part performance whose principal purpose is to overcome non-
compliance with the formal requirements for the making of contracts. Equi-
table estoppel, though it may lead to the plaintiff acquiring an estate or in-
terest in land, depends on considerations of a different kind from those on
which part performance depends. Holding the representor to his representa-
tion is merely one way of doing justice between the parties.
Id. at [32].
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the Second Restatement.05 They first point out that English and
Australian courts have been "reluctan[t] to allow promissory es-
toppel to become the vehicle for the positive enforcement of a rep-
resentation by a party that he would do something in the fu-
ture.""' Then, after citing scholars who have argued against this
position, they explicitly cite the developments in the United
States as being more in tune with the ostensible functions of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel. They stridently state:
It is perhaps sufficient to say that in the United States, as in Austra-
lia, there is an obvious interrelationship between the doctrines of
consideration and promissory estoppel, promissory estoppel tending
to occupy ground left vacant due to the constraints affecting consid-
eration.
The proposition stated in [section] 90(1) of the Restatement seems
on its face to reflect a closer connection with the general law of con-
tract than our doctrine of promissory estoppel, with its origins in the
equitable concept of unconscionable conduct, might be thought to al-
low. This is because in the United States promissory estoppel has be-
come an equivalent or substitute for consideration in contract forma-
tion, detriment being an element common to both doctrines.
Nonetheless the proposition, by making the enforcement of the prom-
ise conditional on (a) a reasonable expectation on the part of the
promisor that his promise will induce action or forbearance by the
promisee and (b) the impossibility of avoiding injustice by other
means, makes it clear that the promise is enforced in circumstances
where departure from it is unconscionable. Note that the emphasis is
on the promisor's reasonable expectation that his promise will induce
action or forbearance, not on the fact that he created or encouraged
an expectation in the promisee of performance of the promise.407
This decision became the fountainhead of the American-style
doctrine of promissory estoppel in Australia. 4°" This Australian
development caught the eye of several English judges who are
now citing to this line of cases to urge a reconsideration of the
English position. This trend is exemplified by the decision of
Lord Justice Walker in Gordon Derby v. Scottish Equitable Plc. 
409
While not basing his decision on the "unified" estoppel, Lord Jus-
tice Walker supported its evolution in the following paragraph:
405. (1988) 164 C.L.R. 387, at [24], [261, [341.
406. Id. at [211.
407. Id. at [25]-[26].
408. Other decisions in this line of cases include Foran v. Wright, (1989) 168 C.L.R.
385, and Commonwealth v. Verwayen, (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394.
409. [2001] EWCA (Civ) (369) at [48].
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Will estoppel by representation wither away as a defence to a claim
for restitution of money paid under a mistake of fact? It can be pre-
dicted with some confidence that with the emergence of the defence
of change of position, the court will no longer feel constrained to find
that a representation has been made, in a borderline case, in order to
avoid an unjust result. It can also be predicted, rather less confi-
dently, that development of the law on a case by case basis will have
the effect of enlarging rather than narrowing the exception recog-
nised by this court in Avon County Council v. Howlett. That process
might be hastened (or simply overtaken) if the House of Lords were
to move away from the evidential origin of estoppel by representa-
tion towards a more unified doctrine of estoppel, since proprietary
estoppel is a highly flexible doctrine which, so far from operating as
"all or nothing," aims at "the minimum equity to do justice." Paul
Key has drawn attention to two decisions of the High Court of Aus-
tralia (Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387
and Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394)
which he describes as a fundamental attack on the traditional per-
ception of estoppel as a complete defence.
4 10
These Australian cases have been cited in a number of other
English cases.4 11 English legal commentators have also drawn in-
spiration from the Australian developments to urge English
courts to "unify" estoppel into a single doctrine with offensive ca-
pacities.412 Leading English contracts scholar, Guenter Treitel,
gives a clue about the reason for this curious development. 1 3 He
hypothesizes that the Waltons Stores doctrine is "perhaps more
likely than the American doctrine to be influential in England
since the Australian and English judicial styles of argument and
analysis are closer to each other than either is to the Ameri-
can."
414
Fourth, beyond these calls for a "unified" estoppel, some
American legal commentators have also openly called on English
courts to emulate American courts in endorsing the American
410. Gordon Derby, [20011 EWCA (Civ) 369, (citations omitted); see also Nat'l West-
minster Bank PLC v. Somer Int'l (UK) Ltd., [2001] EWCA (Civ) 970, [2002] 3 W.L.R. 64
(Potter, L.J.).
411. See, e.g., Petromec Inc. v. Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. Petrobras, [2004] EWHC
(Comm) 127; Brennan v. Bolt Burdon [2003] EWHC (QB) 2493; Actionstrength Ltd. v. Int'l
Glass Eng'g, [2003] UKHL 17, [2003] 2 W.L.R. 1060; In re Goldcorp Exch. Ltd. [1994] 3
W.L.R. 199.
412. See, e.g., Mark Lunney, supra note 400 at 239; P.T. Evans, Choosing the Right Es-
toppel 1988 CONV. & PROP. LAw (N.S.) 346.
413. Treitel, supra note 364, at 357.
414. Id.
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version of promissory estoppel.415 One of the leading authorities
on English contract law has stated that the process of growth of
promissory estoppel in the United States "is one from which [the
English] can learn."416 As noted above, these calls have increased
with Australia's embrace of section 90-like promissory estoppel.417
XI. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS BOTH A SUCCESSFUL AND
UNSUCCESSFUL LEGAL TRANSPLANT
The account of the "genesis" and evolution of promissory estop-
pel in early-twentieth century United States suggests two ways to
interpret what happened to the idea of estoppel in the drafting of
the First Restatement. One way is to read it as a story of inven-
tion and a successful legal transplant. Williston invented a new
form of estoppel, and in so doing, he modified the old form of es-
toppel borrowed from merry old England to suit the American cir-
cumstances: the representation no longer had to be of some past
or existing fact, and the representation itself, without more, could
found a cause of action. It is a story of a successful transplant: a
concept borrowed advertently, with a clear understanding of its
nature and functions in the exporting legal system and crafted
carefully to consciously suit the objectives of the borrowing legal
culture.
A second way to read it is as the more familiar story of an "un-
successful" legal transplant: where the importer has a particular
idea about the concept being transplanted and how it operates in
the exporting legal culture and then tinkering with it to suit one's
purpose in the importing legal culture. It later turns out that the
importer, however, in transplanting, edits and deflects the con-
cept due to either an imperfect understanding of the transplant
and how it operates in its original legal culture ("deflection") or a
refraction caused by the exact circumstances in which the trans-
planting takes place.
415. As early as 1929, Professor Winfield had called for the importation of the doctrine
into English law. See P.H. Winfield, The American Restatement of the Law of Contracts 11
J. CoMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 179, 186 (1929) ("We should like to see the rule of [section] 90
incorporated into English law.").
416. P.S. Atiyah, When Is an Enforceable Agreement Not a Contract? Answer: When It
Is an Equity, 92 LAW Q. REV. 174, 179 (1976).
417. See supra notes 405-08 and accompanying text.
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If we conceive the American concept of promissory estoppel as a
legal transplant, was it a successful one or not? First of all, let us
take stock of what we know. This account has shown that al-
though there were no significant "cultural" differences between
England and the United States at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, the importation of English ideas of estoppel into the United
States underwent some "editing," "reflection," and "refraction" in
the process of importation.41 The "mutation" of the transplanted
concept was, contrary to what conventional theories of legal
transplants would hypothesize, not because of any "cultural" dif-
ferences. 19 Rather, this "mutation" was a result of "pragmatic
borrowing": the borrowing of a concept from another system with
a clear idea about the role that the borrower would want the bor-
rowed concept to play in the importing legal system. In this situa-
tion, the borrower often "misreads" both how the concept func-
tions in its autochthonous legal culture and the mutation that the
transplant is likely to undergo when placed in foreign soil.42°
Such misreading, however, may also increase the legal trans-
plant's chances of success by aligning the legal transplant with
the borrower's pragmatic concern. In such cases then, a trans-
plant becomes successful precisely by being "unsuccessful," i.e., by
facilitating a "mutation," the borrower ensures that the legal
transplant will not be received in its pristine nature, and im-
proves the chances that the transplant will serve the function re-
quired by the borrowing legal system.42' Looking at the doctrine
of promissory estoppel from this perspective, one may argue that
the American doctrine of promissory estoppel was both a success-
ful and unsuccessful legal transplant.
418. See supra Parts III and IV.
419. See supra Kahn-Freund, supra note 247.
420. An example of how, often, both indigenous legal concepts and foreign legal con-
cepts sought to be borrowed are misunderstood when transplanting new legal norm, is af-
forded by the attempts to export "Western" private property rights to developing countries.
See, e.g., Joel Ngugi, Re-Examining the Role of Private Property in Market Democracies:
Problematic Ideological Issues Raised by Land Registration, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 467
(2004).
421. Alan Watson argues that in fact such facilitated "mutation" makes it possible for
the legal transplant to be "reformed or made more sophisticated [hence giving] "the recipi-
ent society a fine opportunity to become a donor in its turn." WATSON, supra note 13, at 99.
Watson argues that a legal transplant can also be influential even when it is totally mis-
understood and gives the famous example of Montesquieu's misunderstanding of the doc-
trine of separation of powers under the English Constitution. Although Montesquieu's de-
scription of the English Constitution was far from reality, "his views were of fundamental
importance to the framers of the American constitution though they were under no illu-
sion as to the true nature of the English constitution." Id.
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The argument that the development of the American concept of
promissory estoppel is an instantiation of an "unsuccessful" legal
transplant could go as follows. Not only did Williston fail to take
sufficient account of the fact that the estoppel he had in mind had
never been a cause of action ("refraction"), but also some of the
courts that had relied on the concept had failed to "notice" that
equitable estoppel was restricted to representations of fact ("de-
flection").422 While the deflection helped persuade Williston that
courts had already created such a principle in practice, it is Wil-
liston's refraction that eventually led to the expansion of the
principle. Williston was also mistaken about extant legal doc-
trines in particular, the Hughes doctrine and the doctrine of pro-
prietary estoppel-which could address the concerns he had
about the doctrine of consideration.
Yet, this story of "unsuccessful" transplant is a success story in
another important way. The newly minted concept of promissory
estoppel proved immensely successful in transforming the law of
contract. Indeed, the transplant was so successful that it
unleashed efforts to modify estoppel in the "mother" country from
whence it was plucked. It would seem, therefore, that the Ameri-
can concept of promissory estoppel was "successful," as a trans-
plant simply by being "unsuccessful," i.e., by undergoing suffi-
cient revision and edition from its original form in the mother
country in the process of borrowing.
Why do some legal transplants succeed while others fail? From
Profesor Alan Watson's theory, the more mechanical a legal con-
cept, the more likely it would succeed.423 Recent experiences in
transplanting commercial codes to a host of transition economies,
however, suggests otherwise. Many of these transplants have
failed.424 On the other hand, an extension of Professor Duncan
Kennedy's theory would suggest that a transplant is more likely
422. The perfect example here is Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
423. See WATSON, supra note 13, at 1-7, 95-99.
424. See, e.g., YVES DEZELAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
PALACE WARS (2002); John Gillespie, Transplanted Company Law: An Ideological and
Cultural Analysis of Market-Entry in Vietnam, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 641 (2002); Mark
Goodale, The Globalization of Sympathetic Law and Its Consequences, 27 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 595 (2002); Inga Markovits, Exporting Law Reform-But Will it Travel?, 37
CORNELL INTL L.J. 95 (2004); Laura Nader & Elizabetta Grande, Current Illusions and
Delusions about Conflict Management-In Africa and Elsewhere, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
573, 574 (2002).
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425to succeed if there is a "prestige" premium. A legal transplant
is more likely to be successful if the donor is deemed to be "cul-
turally prestigious. ' 426 This would adequately explain the real
reasons for transplanting but would be limited in its explanatory
power as to why some of these transplants succeed while others
fail.
Given the history and account of the development of promis-
sory estoppel in the United States that I have given above, I wish
to tentatively hypothesize that a legal transplant stands the best
chance of "succeeding" when it is a "conceptual" rather than a
"mechanical" transplant.
A "conceptual" transplant is one whereby the borrower is inter-
ested only in the substantive doctrine and the broad functions it
is supposed to play in the legal system. This leaves plenty of room
for the recipient to tinker with the transplant to let it fit in the
recipient's legal system. It follows that doctrines that are "equita-
ble" in nature are more likely to fit into this mold than entirely
"legal" doctrines. It also follows that a doctrine such as "promis-
sory estoppel" would fair better than a conglomeration of legal
rules like a corporate code. The former is "equitable;" it takes the
shape and color of the legal system in which it is transported, and
it is filled with local content. The latter is rigid; it seeks to recre-
ate the conditions from whence it was plucked, and it resists legal
content.
It would seem from this account that promissory estoppel has
been successful as a legal transplant neither because it is "me-
chanical" nor because of the "prestige" premium. Rather, it seems
that promissory estoppel is influential precisely because it defies
rigid characterization as a formulaic "model" of addressing doc-
trinal lacunae. Instead, promissory estoppel characterizes itself
as a flexible, equitable, and malleable doctrine that acquires the
425. Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631 (2003).
426. For example, Gianmaria Ajani explains that one reason why laws transplanted
from Western countries to Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the collapse of communism
took root is the "prestige factor." Prestige works in two ways. First, laws borrowed from
countries which are considered "culturally prestigious" are likely to be more successful be-
cause they are likely to be accepted by the politicians, lawyers, technocrats, civil society,
and citizens of the receiving country. Second, passing such laws is an attached prestige
necessary to impress international institutions and foreign investors. See Gianmaria
Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 93 (1995).
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form and substance of the legal system where it is borrowed, al-
lowing it to fit with the local circumstances. Promissory estoppel
does well as a concept precisely because it is defined in singularly
broad, "equitable," and "promiscuous" terms that defy rigid for-
mulation. The local conditions are left to supply the actual con-
tours of the concept through application and derivation of princi-
ples.
XII. CONCLUSION
This article recast the history of the American doctrine of
promissory estoppel as a legal transplant. In doing so, it moved
beyond the orthodox accounts of its development in late-
nineteenth century America, and traced its roots to earlier forms
of the English conception of estoppel in pais. By pursuing the his-
tory of the doctrine under English law, the doctrine gave us an
opportunity to consider, and approve the theory that the need for
the invention of the theory of promissory estoppel in American
contract law was only necessitated by the revision in the defini-
tion of the doctrine of consideration in bargain terms by Samuel
Williston-a revision that was, in turn, made necessary by the
prevailing ethos of the CLT. In inventing the American doctrine
of promissory estoppel by "borrowing" and modifying the estoppel
concept from English law, however, Williston unwittingly "liber-
alized" estoppel by unshackling it from some of the restrictive
doctrinal rigidities it labored under in English law. The result
was that, contrary to Williston's intentions, the American doc-
trine of promissory estoppel ended up expanding, not restricting,
the range of contractual liability. Nonetheless, this Willistonian
"invention" of promissory estoppel by "borrowing" from England
became so successful in the United States that, in a curious case
of "reverse influence," there are calls to re-import the American
version of the doctrine back to England. I used this historical ac-
count to hypothesize on what makes legal transplants successful.
2007]

